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ABSTRACT
ARE PEOPLE MOTIVATED TO EXPERIENCE EMOTIONS FOR THEIR
COGNITIVE IMPACTS? THE MOTIVATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF COGNITIVE
APPRAISAL THEORIES OF EMOTION
SEPTEMBER 2016
DANIEL R. ROVENPOR, B.A., BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Linda M. Isbell
I propose a novel framework for understanding why people want to feel different
emotions. I argue that people may be motivated to experience emotions for the cognitive
appraisals they are associated with. In an effort to lay the foundation for an appraisalbased model of emotional preferences, I drew upon research on cognitive appraisal
theories of emotion, emotional preferences, and basic human motivation. I tested my
proposed model by either measuring (Study 1) or manipulating (Studies 2-7) appraisals
and measuring emotional preferences, using anger (Studies 1-6) and guilt (Study 7) as
specific test cases. I predicted that uncertainty appraisals would lead participants to prefer
to feel anger, an emotion associated with appraisals of certainty. I also predicted that low
control appraisals would lead participants to prefer to feel guilt, an emotion associated
with appraisals of personal control. First, using large surveys, I demonstrated that people
who tend to be uncertain also tend to experience greater levels of anger (Study 1). I then
found that experimental inductions of uncertainty led to stronger preferences for and
experiences of anger (Study 4), particularly among those motivated to reduce uncertainty
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(Study 2) and who are aware of the association between anger and certainty (Study 3).
Inducing a mindset of uncertainty tolerance, on the other hand, reduced anger experience
(Study 5). Finally, people lacking a sense of control expressed a stronger preference for
guilt (Study 7). These findings suggest that people are motivated to experience negative
emotions when they can provide for their appraisal needs. I discuss the implications of
these findings for research on cognitive appraisal theories of emotion and emotional
preferences. In doing so, I aim to more fully integrate the affect-cognition and emotion
regulation literatures.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Despite decades of research on what emotions are, how they interact with
cognition, and how they influence motivational and behavioral outcomes, very little
research has investigated the motivational precursors of emotions. Indeed, despite the
nearly 12,000 articles published on “emotion regulation” in 2013 alone (Gross, 2015),
very few of them have considered how people want to feel and why (Tamir, 2009). That
is, very few have asked, what emotions are people motivated to experience and what are
the properties of different emotions that make emotions desirable? It is possible that
research on this topic has been impeded by the lay notion that people are simply
motivated to feel positive emotions. Yet it should also be apparent to lay observers that
negative emotions are experienced very frequently, and not always for reasons that are
easily explained by situational or individual difference factors. This raises the question of
whether motivational factors play a role in shaping the extent to which people experience
negative emotions, and whether people tend to experience negative emotions because
they want to experience them.
The field of emotion regulation has aimed to understand “how individuals
influence which emotions they have, when they have them, and how they experience and
express them” (Gross, 1998). Yet, most research on emotion regulation assumes that
people have hedonic goals and considers different strategies people can use to achieve
these goals (Gross, 2015). Emotion regulation theorists have repeatedly emphasized the
need to better understand the psychological processes that precede the onset of emotion
regulation – the processes that shape people’s emotional goals, or how people want to
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feel to begin with (see Gross, 1998; 2013; 2015). Because emotional goals operate so
early in the emotion generation process (and prior to any of the regulation strategies) they
can have dramatic effects on the development and regulation of emotions. In other words,
because of their primacy, even a small change in goals at the beginning of the emotion
generation process has the potential to entirely transform the unfolding of the emotion
regulation process and the resulting emotional experience. Thus, rather than only
focusing on how people deal with emotions once they are experienced, understanding
how people want to feel in the first place is critical for understanding both emotion
generation and emotion regulation.
Despite the importance of this topic, research on the factors that shape emotional
preferences has only emerged as a focused area of inquiry over the past seven years (for
reviews see Tamir, 2009; 2016). Most researchers appear to have adopted the lay
intuition that people want to feel positive emotions and avoid negative ones. Yet, once
researchers began questioning this axiom, they found that there is substantial variability
in the extent to which people want to feel positive and negative emotions (Tamir, 2009).
A variety of factors that influence emotional preferences have been identified, and I will
review these factors next. Afterward, I will argue that the present research introduces a
major component to our understanding of emotional preferences that has been overlooked
to date, and thereby advances a richer and more complete framework for understanding
why people want to experience a variety of emotions.
The Emerging Science of Emotional Preferences
A review of the literature reveals that several factors have been shown to
influence how people want to feel. It also reveals that these factors are based in disparate
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literatures (e.g., clinical, social, cross-cultural, developmental) and lack an overarching
integrative framework. Much of this research was not intended to contribute to an
understanding of emotional preferences, but rather to an understanding of other content
areas, such as aging, culture, or individual differences. Below, I briefly review the
variables known to influence how people want to feel.
Utility. Most notably, numerous studies have demonstrated that people prefer
negative emotions when they are perceived to be useful in a given situation. For example,
people prefer to feel angry when they need to engage in a confrontational negotiation or
when they anticipate playing a violent video game, but prefer to feel afraid when they
anticipate playing a video game involving avoiding deadly characters (Ford & Tamir,
2012; Tamir & Ford, 2012; Tamir, Ford, & Gillam, 2013; Tamir, Ford, & Ryan, 2013; for
reviews, see Tamir, 2009, 2016). Thus, emotions can be instrumental in helping us
navigate different situations, and people prefer emotions they believe will help them
navigate situations most effectively. This research was among the first in psychology to
argue and demonstrate that people do not want to feel emotions for hedonic reasons
alone.
Familiarity. Research also demonstrates that people prefer emotions that are
familiar to them (Ford & Tamir, 2014). That is, the more familiar people say they are
with an emotion – whether positive or negative – the more they want to experience that
emotion. Relatedly, research demonstrates that clinically depressed individuals tend to
choose to maintain or increase levels of sadness (Millgram, Joorman, Huppert, & Tamir,
2015).
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Culture. Clear cultural differences in emotional preferences have emerged:
Americans tend to show a preference for more arousing positive emotions than people in
East Asian cultures (e.g., Tsai, Knutson, & Fung, 2006). Thus, cultural values shape how
people want to feel.
Age. It has also been suggested that older adults may have a stronger preference
for positive emotional experiences compared to younger adults (Charles, 2010;
Rovenpor, Skogsberg, & Isaacowitz, 2013; Urry & Gross, 2010). This is consistent with
socioemotional selectivity theory, which argues that older adults are motivated to
experience positive emotions because they have a sense of limited time and therefore
reconsider their emotional priorities (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999).
Stimulus factors. Research has demonstrated that stimulus valence and arousal
jointly predict emotional preferences (Suri, Sheppes, & Gross, 2012; Sheppes, Scheibe,
Suri, Radu, Blechert, & Gross, 2012). Specifically, people seem to prefer emotional
experiences (viewing IAPS images, in this research) that are positive in valence but only
moderately arousing.
Individual difference factors. Researchers have studied emotional preferences as
individual difference characteristics by developing self-report measures of explicit
attitudes toward emotions, which have been shown to predict the types of emotional
situations people seek out (Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & Gable, 2011).
Classic research on sensation seeking similarly demonstrated that people vary in the
extent to which they seek out novel, complex, and intense emotional experiences
(Zuckerman, 1979).
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To summarize, research has demonstrated that utility, familiarity, culture, age,
and attitudes influence how we want to feel. These findings have informed disparate
literatures. Further, with the exception of the work on utility, researchers have generally
not gone beyond individual characteristics (e.g., age, attitudes toward emotions,
familiarity with emotions, cultural background) to consider what it is about an emotional
state that might make it desirable. Given that emotions are associated with many other
qualities that vary along many dimensions, as documented by cognitive appraisal theories
of emotion (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), it is likely that these dimensions play a role in
why people want to feel different emotions. The current research investigates whether
people seek out emotions to experience the appraisals they are associated with. In doing
so, I search beyond valence, arousal, individual characteristics, and situational utility as
factors influencing emotional preferences, and aim to develop a novel and systematic
framework for investigating emotional preferences.
Cognitive Appraisal Theories of Emotion
Appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth,
1985) have been highly generative for organizing research on the links between particular
emotions and particular cognitive appraisals. Smith and Ellsworth (1985) demonstrated
that discrete emotional experiences are associated with unique profiles of cognitive
appraisals. They asked participants to recall past experiences in which they felt a variety
of emotions and then asked participants to rate those experiences on a number of
appraisal dimensions, including pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, attentional
activity, self-other responsibility/control and situational control. They found that
emotions systematically varied along these dimensions and that the dimensions
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effectively differentiated between discrete emotions. Further illustrating the importance
of cognitive appraisals, more recent research has shown that appraisals not only
characterize emotional experience, but also shape how emotions impact decision-making
and behavior. For example, research demonstrates that anger leads people to feel more
confident in risk-taking tasks and thereby increases people’s tendencies to take risks
(Lerner & Keltner, 2001). Taken together, this work demonstrates not only that emotions
are associated with different appraisals, but that these appraisals also determine the
consequences that particular emotions have on subsequent, often seemingly unrelated,
outcomes. What has not yet been considered is whether preferences for emotions are
driven by the cognitive appraisals that characterize emotions and their consequences. In
other words, appraisal theories of emotion have proven incredibly useful for
understanding the cognitive, behavioral, and motivational consequences of discrete
emotions based on their fundamental underlying dimensional qualities. However, to date,
no work has extended this framework to better understand why people select different
emotional experiences in the first place.
I argue that existing appraisal models offer a rich starting point for building a
framework of emotional preferences. By documenting the cognitive appraisals associated
with specific emotions, appraisal theories provide the clues about possible reasons people
might want to experience different emotions. The present research aims to integrate what
is known about emotional preferences and what is known about cognitive appraisals to
bridge the two literatures.
Appraisal theories discuss the associations between emotions and appraisals in
almost exclusively correlational terms. Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) analysis was purely
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correlational, demonstrating associations between particular cognitive appraisals and
particular emotions. There is no consensus on the causal direction between appraisals and
emotions. Underscoring this point, in a recent review of appraisal theories of emotion,
Phoebe Ellsworth (2013) wrote, “I am often asked whether I think that appraisals cause
emotions: yes or no? My writings have been unclear on this point... The issue of causality
in emotion is a vexing one for me, and one that I have generally tried to avoid”
(Ellsworth, 2013, p. 125). The present research does not have any bearing on the topic of
the causal relationship between appraisals and emotions. What the present work does
suggest, however, is that appraisal theorists have not attended to a potential important
implication of appraisal theories. That is, if emotions are associated with appraisals,
being on the low end of an appraisal dimension may cause an emotion to arise for
motivational reasons, because people will choose to feel an emotion that can boost the
deficient appraisal. For example, appraisal research has demonstrated that anger tends to
co-occur with appraisals of certainty. The literature remains agnostic as to whether anger
causes the certainty appraisals or whether the certainty appraisals cause the anger. But the
causal question that this debate has failed to ask is whether uncertainty can lead to anger,
because individuals experiencing uncertainty may be motivated to feel angry to attain the
certainty appraisals contained within it. Thus, in addition to applying appraisal theory to
advance our understanding of emotional preferences, I attempt to incorporate a
motivational component into appraisal theories of emotion, seeking causal evidence that
appraisal deficits can lead to the generation of emotions that can mitigate those deficits.
In short, it is not relevant to my perspective whether certainty causes anger or
anger causes certainty. Instead, I aim to provide evidence that uncertainty causes anger.

7

By incorporating a hydraulic/motivational component into what has been a debate about
the causal relationship between emotion and cognition, I make novel causal predictions
about the association between cognitive appraisals and emotions.
An Appraisal-Based Understanding of Emotional Preferences
I propose an appraisal-based model of emotional preferences that integrates
research on emotion regulation and emotional preferences with the cognitive appraisal
tradition. Such integration will lay the groundwork for a broad framework that identifies
reasons why many different emotions might be desired based on many different appraisal
dimensions. Although most empirical evidence in the present research will consider the
cognitive appraisal dimension of certainty and the emotion of anger as a starting point,
this will lay the groundwork, in terms of both ideas and methods, for future work that can
test other appraisal-emotion pairs. For example, appraisals of low interest and low arousal
(e.g., common in boredom) may lead people to prefer emotions high in interest or arousal
(e.g., excitement, anxiety). Of course, more surprising predictions would involve
emotions that might be sought out despite having a negative valence. An example of this
would be guilt, which is high on appraisals of control and self-responsibility. It follows
that people who lack a sense of control in the world might want to feel guilt in order to
alleviate their diminished sense of control. I will provide an initial test of this hypothesis
in the final study in this dissertation.
Motivational direction (i.e., approach versus avoidance) has emerged as another
key dimension along which emotions vary (e.g., Harmon-Jones & Allen, 1998). It may be
that the hydraulic prediction applies here as well, and that being low in approach
orientation leads one to prefer approach-oriented emotions. Indeed, cognitive appraisals
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may only be a starting point for understanding why emotions are sought out for their
dimensional qualities. By considering the fundamental qualities of emotions as
motivating factors for pursuing different emotions, this work will represent a systematic,
dimensional, theoretically-driven attempt to understand a wide range of emotional
preferences. This work will integrate research on motivation, emotions, and cognitive
appraisals in pursuit of a novel model of emotional preferences (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Basic overview of proposed model.
Anger as an Initial Test Case
I tested my predictions by using anger as an initial test case. Anger provides an
ideal context for testing my research questions because, among other reasons, large
literatures already exist on the cognitive concomitants of anger and on the motivation to
regulate uncertainty, though no research to date has connected these literatures. This
work on anger will not only serve as a context for testing an appraisal-based model of
emotional preferences, but will serve as an opportunity to illustrate the importance and
applicability of this model for answering important questions about the development and
regulation of anger. As such, this work is expected to have theoretical as well as applied
implications.
Anger frequently plagues everything from interpersonal relationships (Lemay et
al., 2012), to intergroup relations (Iyer & Leach, 2008), to physical health (Smith et al.,
2004). Yet, according to many estimates, anger is one of the most frequently experienced
emotions (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006; Averill, 1986). Why, then, are people so prone to
9

feeling angry, even though there are many good reasons to avoid it? In contrast to the lay
notion that anger is something people try to avoid but sometimes involuntarily get
“caught up in,” I propose that people may be implicitly drawn toward anger because it
promises to enhance one’s sense of certainty. If such an alluring quality draws people
toward anger, it may contribute to a vicious cycle in which individuals lack certainty, turn
to anger to boost it, and only create more problems (i.e., personal, interpersonal,
intergroup), without ever addressing the core problem – a lack of certainty. Identifying
the starting point of this cycle may help us to more effectively end it.
Anger is experienced as a high-arousal negative emotion (Russell & Barrett,
1999). People report that they dislike the experience of anger (Carver & Harmon-Jones,
2009). Although anger is similar to other negative emotions (i.e., fear) on levels of
valence and arousal, a key distinguishing feature of anger relative to other negative
emotions is that it is associated with a sense of certainty, confidence, and selfrighteousness (e.g., Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). People get angry when they are sure about
their stance on an issue, and feeling anger is an intense experience that in turn solidifies
this sense of certainty. For these reasons, some researchers have even briefly discussed
the possibility that anger might be more appropriately labeled as a “positive” emotion
(Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). Though these researchers
conclude that anger is ultimately best classified as a negative emotion based on the lack
of empirical data suggesting positivity per se, current theorizing about emotion strongly
supports the idea that there is something appealing about anger, even if this appeal cannot
be directly captured by measures of self-reported attitudes toward anger.
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Converging evidence from research on the effect of anger on cognition reveals
that anger influences cognitive outcomes in much the same way happiness does, and
suggests that anger may be one of the few negative emotions to exhibit such effects. For
example, an array of research demonstrates that, just like happiness, anger enhances
judgments of certainty (Tiedens & Linton, 2001), promotes people’s tendencies to use
heuristics (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994), and functions as a cognitive “go”
signal that conveys positive value on accessible modes of thought (Isbell, Rovenpor, &
Lair, 2016). Building on Smith and Ellsworth’s initial evidence for an association
between anger and certainty, these experimental findings have confirmed that certainty is
a defining feature of anger that is responsible for many of its unique cognitive
consequences. Could this core feature of how anger is experienced and how it influences
our thoughts, then, also help us understand why anger is so commonly experienced?
A growing body of research demonstrates that people have a strong motivation to
feel certain and mitigate uncertainty. People go to great lengths to manage and
compensate for uncertainty (e.g., Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov,
1991; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; McGregor, Nash, Mann, & Phills, 2010; McGregor,
Nash, & Prentice, 2010; Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997; Van den Bos, 2001), even when
it is experienced subtly (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). Thus, good evidence exists that
certainty represents a fundamental object of human motivation. If certainty is the
distinguishing feature of anger, and the pursuit of certainty is a defining feature of the
human experience, then anger may be the emotional experience that is uniquely able to
satisfy a core psychological motive. It thus seems plausible that individuals may gravitate
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toward anger-inducing situations in a motivated attempt to alleviate uncertainty. The
current research directly tests this heretofore untested possibility.
Guilt as a Second Test Case
The present research aims to build a strong foundation for a broad appraisal-based
model of emotional preferences and thus uses anger as a starting point. However, a
second, perhaps even more counterintuitive hypothesis generated by the model is that
people who lack a sense of control may prefer to feel even negative emotions that contain
responsibility and control appraisals, such as guilt. The notion that people have a strong
desire for control is even more widely supported than the notion that people have a strong
desire to attain certainty. Indeed, the importance of a sense of control in human
functioning is a key cornerstone of the psychological literature, emerging as a central
theme in the clinical (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978), health (e.g., Rodin,
1986; Taylor & Brown, 1988; Wrosch, Heckhausen, & Lachman, 2000), personality
(e.g., Ryan & Deci; 2000), well-being (e.g., Ryff & Keyes, 1995), social (e.g., Bandura,
1977; Dweck & Legget, 1988; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), organizational (e.g.,
Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 1991) and developmental (e.g., Baltes, 1997;
Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010) literatures. Given that guilt has been shown to be
associated with appraisals of control and self-responsibility (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985), it
is possible that guilt would be preferred to a greater extent by individuals who lack a
strong sense of control or self-responsibility. This would illustrate that people are more
receptive to feeling guilty when it serves their appraisal needs. Given the important
implications of experiencing guilt for interpersonal relationships and intergroup relations,
among other domains (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Lickel, Schmader,
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Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005; Tangney, 1995), understanding the motivational factors
that allow for heightened feelings of guilt could have important applied implications.
Methodological Considerations for Studying Emotional Preferences
Several experimental paradigms have been used to study emotional preferences.
Three such paradigms have been employed in Maya Tamir’s work on the instrumental
value of emotions (see Tamir, 2009 for a review). In one paradigm, Tamir and her
colleagues ask participants to listen to 20-second snippets of music that evoke different
emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger, fear) and have participants rate the extent to
which they would like to listen to similar music in an upcoming task. In another measure
of emotional preferences, participants are told that they will engage in a recall task, and
are asked to rate the extent to which they would like to recall several different types of
emotional experiences. Finally, Tamir and her colleagues also assess emotional
preferences via explicit self-report measures. In research that I have conducted previously
on emotional preferences, I displayed media items to participants that evoked different
emotions and asked participants to select the material they were most interested in
engaging with (Rovenpor & Isbell, under review; Rovenpor, Skogsberg, & Isaacowitz,
2013).
I adapted several of these paradigms for the present research. Critical to my
selection of methodological approaches was the notion that it should be at least possible
for participants to realize that choosing to feel a particular emotion may have
consequences for the cognitive appraisals they experience. This ruled out the use of the
music paradigm. It is likely difficult for participants to discern that listening to upbeat
heavy metal music has the potential to increase the specific cognitive appraisals they will
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experience. My hypothesized effects are more likely to emerge when participants can
experience a “taste” of the emotion they will express preferences for – and thus a
sampling of the appraisals they could experience if they maintain or increase the extent to
which they feel that emotion. Thus, rather than merely measure preferences for
hypothetical anger-inducing experiences, I exposed participants to actual emotioninducing experiences and assessed their willingness to prolong them.
It is also important to consider the social desirability concerns that can arise
during the measurement of emotional preferences. For example, social desirability may
inhibit people from fully expressing that they want to feel angry, especially when this
desire arises out of a defensive desire to restore uncertainty and the action taken to reduce
uncertainty is socially frowned upon. Thus, cover stories were used to describe the tasks
that participants were completing (i.e., uncertainty manipulation and anger induction
tasks) as being separate and unrelated.
Further, in addition to simple ratings of emotional preferences, I employed
indirect measures of emotional preferences. The most straightforward index of how
people want to feel after an anger-inducing experience may be how they actually feel
after the experience. If they want to feel angry, they would feel angry. Where possible, I
tested this logic explicitly by assessing whether emotional preferences mediated any
effects on emotional experience. Other unobtrusive measures were collected, such as how
many words people write during a task in which they are asked to write about an angerinducing life experience. Measures of attempts to up-regulate the target emotion or
tendencies to ruminate about the target emotion were also collected. To overcome
concerns that participants may be reluctant to positively affirm that they want to feel a
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negative emotion, I reversed the direction of the question and asked participants how
likely they would be to eliminate the emotion if they could (e.g., via a hypothetical pill).
In these ways, I developed and refined several paradigms for testing my theoretical
perspective.
The Present Research
In the present research, I aimed to establish initial evidence for the idea that
people are motivated to seek out emotions for the appraisals they confer. I first tested this
idea using anger and certainty (Studies 1-6), and later tested this using guilt and control
(Study 7). Following a correlational study (Study 1), the basic experimental design of the
remaining studies (Studies 2-7) involved experimentally manipulating an appraisal (e.g.,
certainty, control) and then measuring emotional preferences. I predicted, for example,
that people experiencing appraisals of uncertainty would be more likely to prefer anger,
to alleviate their uncertainty. Each study also sought evidence that such effects emerged
for motivational reasons. Thus, each study measured or manipulated the desire to attain
the target appraisal (i.e., certainty or control), as well as people’s awareness that the
target emotion contains the desired appraisal. These variables were hypothesized to
moderate the effects of appraisal deficits on emotional preferences.
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Table 1. Overview of studies.
I tested these predictions using correlational data as well as six experiments (see
Table 1 for an overview of these studies). The correlational data (Study 1) used large
samples of survey respondents to test the direction of the association between trait
tendencies to experience uncertainty and trait tendencies to feel angry. Study 2
experimentally manipulated appraisals of uncertainty, exposed participants to an angerinducing video, and assessed how angry participants felt and how angry they wanted to
feel after watching the video. Study 3 attempted to replicate Study 2. Study 4
experimentally manipulated appraisals of uncertainty, asked participants to write about an
anger-inducing life experience, and assessed how much participants wrote, whether they
attempted to up-regulate their experience of anger during the writing task, how angry
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they felt after the writing task, and whether they anticipated ruminating about their anger
in the future. Study 5 experimentally manipulated the desire to reduce versus accept
uncertainty, exposed participants to an anger-inducing article, and assessed the anger they
felt in response to it. Study 6 experimentally manipulated appraisals of uncertainty as
well as the extent to which participants anticipated feeling certain versus uncertain after
reading an anger-inducing article, and measured their preferences for reading the article.
Study 7 experimentally manipulated appraisals of control, asked participants to write
about a guilt-inducing life experience, and assessed participants’ preferences for writing
about this experience as well as their desire to eliminate their guilt after writing about the
experience.
Together, these studies tested whether people want to experience anger (or guilt)
to a greater extent when they are experiencing appraisals of uncertainty (or lack of
control), when they want to reduce that uncertainty (or increase control), and when they
know that anger can provide certainty (or that guilt could provide a sense of
responsibility). In doing so, these studies began to test the idea that people seek out
emotions for the appraisals they confer.
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CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1: CORRELATIONAL EVIDENCE
I first tested my ideas correlationally using large data sets obtained from the
departmental prescreen across four different semesters. Across various semesters, I
measured trait-level uncertainty, need for cognitive closure, anger rumination, and
revenge planning and assessed correlations within each dataset. This correlational data
tested a simple question: Do people who tend to be uncertain also tend to get more angry?
Given that some students completed the prescreen two semesters in a row, I also
combined datasets to test my hypotheses longitudinally. This allowed me to ask the
question: As people become more uncertain or intolerant of uncertainty, do they tend to
ruminate more about their anger?
These data are well-suited to test the direction of the relationship between
uncertainty and anger, but are not intended to provide a sense of the causal direction or
magnitude of the effect. Given that a sizeable literature demonstrates that anger is
associated with a sense of certainty, I expected that it is plausible that anger would be
negatively correlated with measures of trait uncertainty. Therefore, I reasoned that a
positive correlation between anger and trait uncertainty would lend support for my model,
providing evidence that uncertainty, and not certainty, is associated with anger on an
individual difference level. In addition, I predicted that a measure of the desire to
alleviate uncertainty (i.e., need for cognitive closure) should be positively associated with
tendencies to get angry. Given the lack of a salient competing hypothesis for this
inherently motivational variable, I expected that the correlations involving need for
cognitive closure would be stronger than those involving trait uncertainty.
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Method
Participants
I used data from four different surveys administered during four different
semesters. Participants completed the online survey at the beginning of the semester in
exchange for extra course credit. The surveys included many measures not relevant to the
present hypotheses and took approximately 45 minutes to complete. A very small number
of participants were excluded from each sample for taking an unreasonably short or long
amount of time to complete the survey or not reporting having spoken English for at least
5 years. Between 1400-1500 participants completed each survey wave, and more than
400 participants completed two surveys in two successive semesters, allowing for four
within-semester analyses and two between-semester analyses to be conducted. The
precise number of participants in each sample is listed in Table 2.
Measures
The following measures were included in a subset of the datasets, interspersed
amongst other measures. Reliabilities of the measures are listed in Table 2.
Trait uncertainty. I assessed trait-level uncertainty using the 20-item Judgmental
Self-Doubt Scale (e.g., “I am inclined to have trouble knowing where to stand on an
issue”; Mirels, Greblo, & Dean, 2002), which assesses how uncertain participants tend to
be when making judgments and decisions.
Need for cognitive closure. I assessed the motivation to reduce uncertainty using
4 items from the Need for Closure Scale (e.g., “I must get away from all uncertain
situations,” “Unforeseen events upset me greatly”; Roets & Hiel, 2011; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994).
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Revenge planning. I assessed participants’ tendency to desire and plan for
revenge as an indirect measure of preferences for anger using an 11-item revenge
planning scale (e.g., “When someone makes me angry I can’t stop thinking about how to
get back at this person”; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006).
Anger rumination. I assessed participants’ habitual tendency to amplify and
prolong anger using a 10-item anger rumination scale (e.g., “I keep thinking about events
that angered me for a long time”; Denson, Pedersen, & Miller, 2006).
Anxiety and depression. I controlled for potential third variables that could
inflate the relationship between uncertainty (and the desire to reduce uncertainty) and
anger. I assessed anxiety using four items (assessing anxiety in general, anxiety in social
situations, anxiety about public speaking, and anxiety about taking tests). I assessed
depression using 20 items from the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Steer, & Brown,
1996).
Results
Semester

Sample
Size

Measure of Uncertainty

Measure of Anger

Fall 2012

1584

Trait uncertainty (α = .95)

Revenge planning (α = .92)

Spring 2013

1453

Trait uncertainty (α = .95)

Revenge planning (α = .94)

Fall 2015

1420

Need for closure (α =.72 )

Anger rumination (α = .93)

Spring 2016

1427

Need for closure (α = .74)

Anger rumination (α = .93)

448

Change in trait uncertainty

Change in revenge planning

412

Change in need for closure

Change in anger rumination

Fall 2012 to
Spring 2013
Fall 2015 to
Spring 2016

Covariates
None
Anxiety (α = .72)
None
Anxiety (α = .71)
None
None
Depression (α = .92)
None
Change in anxiety
None
Depression (α = .92)

Correlation
r = .151, p < .001
r = .116, p < .001
r = .159, p < .001
r = .136, p < .001
r = .330, p < .001
r = .375, p < .001
r = .298, p < .001
r = .129, p = .006
r = .100, p = .035
r = .160, p < .001
r = .143, p = .004

Table 2. Summary of correlational results.
Table 2 presents the results for all analyses. As shown in Table 2, trait uncertainty
was positively associated with revenge planning. This association was weak yet
consistent across two large surveys. Further, the association remained after controlling
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for anxiety. The positive correlation suggests that uncertainty and preferences for anger
tend to generally coincide. In addition, as predicted, the more people wanted to reduce
their uncertainty, the more they tended to ruminate on their anger, and these correlations
were consistently moderate in size. The association remained after controlling for
depression. This provides more direct evidence for the idea that people who want to
reduce their uncertainty tend to amplify or prolong their anger.
I assessed the test-retest reliability of each measure over time to gain a better
understanding of the extent to which participants’ scores on these trait measures changed
over time. I tested this using correlations between Time 1 and Time 2 measurements. The
results were as follows: r trait uncertainty = .759, r revenge planning = .684, r need for closure = .520, r
anger rumination

= .673. Thus, despite high correlations, there was a degree of change over

time in these measures. I thus considered whether people who become more uncertain
over time also tend to seek more revenge. Indeed, a change in trait uncertainty was
positively correlated with a change in revenge planning, and this association held after
controlling for a change in anxiety from Time 1 to Time 2. Similarly, as participants
developed a stronger desire to reduce uncertainty, they also developed a stronger
tendency to ruminate about anger, and this association held after controlling for time 2
depression (the depression measure was not available at Time 1).
Discussion
These analyses support my hypotheses that uncertainty – and the desire to reduce
it – is associated with tendencies to prolong the experience of anger. Despite the
possibility that negative correlations would emerge between uncertainty and revenge
planning, reflecting the association identified by research on cognitive appraisals
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whereby anger is associated with a sense of certainty, positive correlations instead
emerged between uncertainty and revenge planning. This illustrates that in the real world,
these variables are associated in ways consistent with a motivational/hydraulic
relationship between uncertainty and anger.
These analyses used large samples, and even though the effects are significant, the
effect sizes are small. However, this may not be surprising given the possibility that the
cognitive impact of high certainty on greater anger may have suppressed the motivational
effect. In addition, these results emerged in the absence of a salient induction of
uncertainty or an acute opportunity to feel anger. In the real world, or in an experimental
context in which uncertainty is made salient or participants are provided with a salient
opportunity to feel anger, these effects should be stronger. Although Study 1 began to
rule out third-variable explanations for the reported effects, future correlational research
should aim to include more such variables as covariates. Most importantly, these
correlational findings open the door for experimental research to test the causal
relationship between uncertainty and anger.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2: EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION OF UNCERTAINTY
Study 2 sought experimental evidence for the idea that uncertainty should
heighten preferences for anger. Participants were randomly assigned to complete a task in
which they wrote about a time they experienced uncertainty, certainty, or neither (in a
neutral/control condition). Next, all participants were exposed to the same anger-inducing
video. Participants then rated how angry they felt and how angry they wanted to feel.
This study thus tested my hypothesis that experiencing uncertainty (compared to
certainty) leads people to want to experience more anger and, in turn, actually experience
more anger. Importantly, I also tested whether this effect is stronger among people who
are highly motivated to reduce uncertainty (i.e., high in need for cognitive closure),
thereby directly testing the hypothesized motivational mechanism for the effect.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from a pool of approximately 1400 students who
completed a large departmental prescreening at the beginning of the semester, which
included a measure of need for cognitive closure (Roets & Hiel, 2011; Webster &
Kruglanski, 1994). A subset of those who completed the prescreen were invited to
complete a lab study, and 140 participants took part in exchange for extra course credit. I
excluded one participant who did not follow instructions on the writing task constituting
the manipulation, seven participants who did not watch the entire anger-inducing video,
and four outliers on a measure of anger felt after the video (they were below the midpoint
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of the scale and over 2 SDs below the mean), leaving 128 participants in the final sample
(22 males, 105 females, 1 “other”).
Procedure
Participants were told that the study would consist of several separate and
unrelated tasks. To manipulate uncertainty, participants were first randomly assigned to
write about a time they felt uncertain, certain, or, in a control condition, about a typical
life event, similar to a procedure used by DeMarree et al. (2012). All participants read the
following:
We are collecting a sample of people’s personal
experiences to use in constructing stimulus materials for a
future study. In the first task, we would like you to help us
develop these materials by writing about a personal life
experience.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to either the certainty,
uncertainty, or control conditions:
[Certainty / Uncertainty conditions]:
We are interested in the types of experiences people
associate with [a sense of certainty and confidence /
uncertainty and doubt]. To help us address this question,
we would like you to write about something you currently
feel [certain or confident / uncertain or doubtful] about.
Please take a few moments to think about something you
really feel [certain / uncertain] about - it can be an event or
a belief you really feel [certain / uncertain] about. Then,
please write about the experience. Be sure to include what
you are [certain / uncertain] about, why you are [certain /
uncertain] about it, and how it makes you feel. Please
describe this as vividly and in as much detail as possible.
You have 5 minutes to complete this task.
[Control condition]:
We are interested in the types of experiences people have in
everyday life. To help us address this question, we would
like you to write about a typical experience in your life.
Please take a few moments to think about an ordinary and
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typical life experience. Then, please write about the
experience. Please describe this as vividly and in as much
detail as possible. You have 5 minutes to complete this
task.

After the manipulation, all participants watched an anger-inducing film clip that
has been used to reliably induce anger in previous research (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross,
2007). The 3-minute clip depicts the South African military killing young schoolchildren
and teachers during a nonviolent protest. Immediately after viewing the video,
participants were asked to rate their current emotions and their emotional preferences
using the measures listed below.
Participants then completed manipulation checks in which they rated how they
felt during the certainty/uncertainty/control writing task. They first reported how
certain/uncertain they felt, which was expected to differ by condition. They then also
reported the extent to which they felt a variety of emotions – ratings which might also
differ by condition, and which could be used as covariates in the analyses. In all studies
reported in this dissertation, these ratings came at the end of the study so as not to
influence participants’ responses to the other measures. By drawing explicit attention to
participants’ inner states, emotion ratings have been known to eliminate effects of
manipulations by leading participants to attempt to correct or adjust for the effects of the
manipulation (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1985). Given that I used well-established
manipulations, that I was more interested in emotional experience after the anger
induction rather than after the manipulation of certainty/uncertainty, and that I did not
want to run the risk of weakening the manipulation’s effects, positioning these ratings at
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the end of the study seemed to be the best option. Finally, as in all studies, participants
responded to demographic questions and were debriefed.
Measures
Need for cognitive closure. Need for cognitive closure was measured weeks
before the study, on the departmental prescreen, using 14 items (e.g., I don’t like
situations that are uncertain; Roets & Hiel, 2011; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; see
appendix). Participants responded on a 6-point scale (1 = Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly
Agree; α = .85).
Emotions after the video. Immediately after viewing the video, participants were
asked to indicate the extent to which they currently feel the following emotions using a 9point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely): sad, angry, afraid, disgusted, upset, anxious,
happy, excited, irritated, agitated, frustrated.
Anger at the perpetrators. Participants were also asked to indicate how angry
they feel specifically toward the military members who shot at the protestors in the video,
using a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely).
Intentions to engage in anger-prolonging behaviors. Participants responded to
three questions assessing the extent to which they anticipated behaving in ways that
would keep anger on their minds for a longer period of time. This measure of behavioral
intentions served as an indirect measure of emotional preferences. We asked participants,
“If you had 15 minutes of free time, how likely would you be to…” “…search the
internet for more information about this event?” “…voice your anger about this event via
social media?” “…discuss your anger over this event with a friend?” Participants
responded on 9-point scales (1 = Not at all likely, 9 = Extremely likely; α = .74).
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Ideal affect. To directly assess emotional preferences, participants were asked to
rate the extent to which they would IDEALLY like to feel the following emotions right
now using a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely): happy, sad, angry, fearful. This
measure was adapted from a measure used in past research (Tsai, 2007).
Beliefs about the link between anger and certainty. To measure the extent to
which participants knew that anger could lead to a sense of certainty, I asked: “In general,
to what extent do you think people feel confident when they are angry?” Participants
responded on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely).
Manipulation Check. To assess the validity of the manipulation, I asked
participants to rate the extent to which they felt the following emotions during the writing
task: Certain, Confident, Doubtful, Sad, Fearful, Angry, Anxious. Participants responded
on a 7-point scale (1 = Not at all, 7 = A great deal).
The first three items were averaged to form a composite measure of uncertainty
(Certain and Confident were reversed; α = .85). The latter four items were averaged to
form a composite measure of negative affect experienced during the manipulation (α =
.79).
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3, below, displays the means and standard deviations for all measures
across conditions.
Measure
Need for cognitive closure
Emotions after the video
Disgusted
Sad
Upset
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M
SD
4.07 0.68
8.53 0.86
8.07 1.27
8.06 1.27

Angry
Frustrated
Irritated
Agitated
Anxious
Afraid
Excited
Happy
Anger at the perpetrators
2-item anger composite
Intentions to engage in angerprolonging behaviors
Ideal affect
Happy
Sad
Angry
Fearful
Beliefs about the link between
anger and certainty
Manipulation Checks
Uncertainty composite
Certain
Confident
Doubtful
Negative affect composite
Sad
Fearful
Angry
Anxious

7.81
6.72
6.14
6.12
5.52
4.66
1.38
1.31
8.03
7.92
6.33

1.36
2.14
2.26
2.24
2.63
2.55
0.94
0.89
1.29
1.17
1.30

7.14
2.25
2.28
1.66
5.20

2.55
2.38
2.44
1.59
1.26

3.19
4.84
4.80
3.20
2.44
2.34
2.35
1.60
3.40

1.60
1.83
1.74
1.89
1.33
1.59
1.68
1.08
2.08

Table 3. Means and standard deviations for main measures in Study 2.
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation had the anticipated effects on the uncertainty manipulation
check composite variable, F(2,125) = 51.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .452. Participants reported
feeling more uncertain in the uncertainty (M = 4.60, SD = 0.99) condition compared to
both the control condition (M = 2.72, SD = 1.41), p < .001, and in the certainty condition
(M = 2.10, SD = 1.14), p < .001. The difference between the control condition and the
high certainty condition was also significant, p = .019, but difference in the means was
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smaller, suggesting that participants in the control condition resembled people who were
high in certainty more than they resembled people who were uncertain.
The manipulation also influenced negative affect, F(2,125) = 15.79, p < .001, ηp2
= .202. Upon reflecting back on the writing task, participants’ reported having
experienced more negative affect in the uncertainty condition (M = 3.25, SD = 1.35)
compared to both the certainty condition (M = 1.93, SD = 0.94) and the control condition
(M = 2.07, SD = 1.25), both p’s < .001. The certainty and control conditions did not
differ, p = .600.
I also analyzed anger as a single item. Participants’ ratings of anger felt during the
task did not differ across conditions, F(2,123) = .958, p = .386, ηp2 = .015, and the
contrast between the certainty (M = 1.40, SD = 0.74) and uncertainty (M = 1.70, SD =
1.26) conditions was not significant, p = .213.
Main Effects of Certainty Manipulation on Key Dependent Variables
No main effects of the certainty manipulation emerged on any of the dependent
variables, p’s > .15.
Moderation by Individual Differences in Motivation and Knowledge
Preferences for anger. I reasoned that people high in the desire to reduce
uncertainty should want to feel (and actually feel) the most angry when they are
uncertain. I thus tested whether need for cognitive closure moderated the effect of the
manipulation on anger preferences and experience. Need for cognitive closure was
measured as a moderator before the study session, and thus scores in the different
conditions did not differ, F(2,125) = .052, p = .950, allowing it to be treated as a
moderator. I used a moderated regression analysis to assess the effects of the
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manipulation at 1 SD above and below the mean of need for cognitive closure. I used the
procedures for testing moderation between a multicategorical and a continuous IV
outlined by Hayes (2013). This analysis revealed an interaction between the manipulation
and need for cognitive closure on ideal anger (i.e., explicit preferences for anger), ΔR2 =
.047, F(2, 122) = 3.13, p = .047 (see Figure 2). The impact of need for cognitive closure
significantly differed in the uncertainty and certainty conditions, b = 1.85, SE = .747, p =
.015. Most importantly, among participants high in need for cognitive closure, those in
the uncertainty condition had a stronger preference for anger than those in the certainty
condition, b = 1.47, SE = .723, p = .045. This suggests that when people feel uncertain
and they want to reduce this feeling, they adopt a stronger preference for anger.
Certainty by Need for Closure Interaction

Anger Preferences

4

3

Uncertainty
Certainty
Control

2

1
Low Need for Closure

High Need for Closure

Figure 2. The effects of uncertainty and need for cognitive closure on preferences for
anger.
Anger experience. Next, I created a composite score reflecting anger experience
by averaging the rating of general anger after the video with the rating of anger toward
the perpetrators in the video (α = .72). I predicted that if people high in need for cognitive
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closure who experience uncertainty want to feel more anger, they should also actually
feel more anger when given the opportunity. As expected, a similar moderated regression
analysis revealed that the manipulation also interacted with need for cognitive closure to
influence anger experience, ΔR2 = .053, F(2, 122) = 3.48, p = .034 (see Figure 3). Need
for cognitive closure was positively related to anger experience only in the uncertainty
condition, b = .613, SE = .249, p = .015, and not in the other conditions, p’s > .25. Thus,
when people are uncertain, the more they generally want to reduce uncertainty, the more
angry they end up feeling. This suggests that preferences for and experiences of anger
result from attempts to manage uncertainty.
Certainty by Need for Closure Interaction

Anger Experience

9

8

Uncertainty
Certainty
Control

7

6
Low Need for Closure

High Need for Closure

Figure 3. The effects of uncertainty and need for cognitive closure on anger experience.
Moderated mediation. Considering these findings in conjunction, I formally
tested whether the reason people high in need for closure experienced more anger in the
low certainty condition was because they preferred to feel anger (using PROCESS with
10,000 bias corrected bootstrap resamples; Hayes, 2013; Model 7). As predicted, the
effect of need for closure on anger experience was mediated by anger preferences in the
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uncertainty condition, b = .5254, SE = .1929, 95% CI [.1607, .9232], but not in the other
conditions, constituting moderated mediation, b = .5107, SE = .2238, 95% CI [.0902,
.9707].
Sadness and preferences for sadness. Although my primary hypotheses were
supported, a prediction that would follow from my framework was not supported. That is,
interactions with similar patterns also emerged between the manipulation and need for
cognitive closure on sadness after the video, ΔR2 = .052, F(2, 122) = 3.45, p = .035, and
preferences for sadness, b = 1.49, SE = .73, p = .044. (Knowledge of the association
between anger and certainty did not moderate any effects.) I discuss these unanticipated
findings in the Discussion section.
Covariates
Given that negative affect experienced during the certainty manipulation differed
across conditions, I reran the analyses controlling for negative affect. The results
remained unchanged. Following guidelines regarding controlling for covariates that are
themselves influenced by an experimental manipulation (Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004),
I reran the analyses controlling for both negative affect and its interaction with the
manipulation, and again the results were unchanged.
Discussion
This research provides initial experimental evidence for the novel proposition that
people are motivated to experience emotions for their appraisals. When faced with
uncertainty, participants preferred to feel angry, and felt more angry, under some
conditions. Consistent with a motivational interpretation, such effects emerged primarily
among people who wanted to reduce uncertainty. The fact that the effects were sensitive
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to the motivation to reduce uncertainty suggests that people who are uncertain may be
seeking out anger particularly for the sense of certainty it conveys (rather than some other
component).
Although unexpected, I found that similar interactions emerged on sadness and
preferences for sadness. This could have occurred because anger and sadness have a lot
in common (i.e., negativity). It therefore may have been hard for participants to dissociate
anger and sadness and only pursue anger but not the sadness elicited by the video. Thus,
participants may have been willing to accept the sadness in order to experience the anger.
The effects of sadness therefore are perhaps not too surprising. Still, this potential
empirical artifact clouds the argument that uncertainty leads people pursue specific
emotions. Given the strong feelings of both anger and sadness, this study was not able to
demonstrate a distinction between the two, and this represents a limitation. It is
noteworthy that although anger was elicited very strongly (M = 7.81), three other
emotions (disgusted, sad, upset) were rated even higher; thus even this classic anger
induction video has trouble eliciting high levels of anger without also eliciting other
strong emotions. Following a replication attempt in Study 3, Study 4 will attempt to
address this limitation using a paradigm in which participants select their own angerinducing experience (in an autobiographical writing paradigm).
One alternative explanation for the finding that uncertain people tend to get more
angry (now demonstrated with correlational and experimental evidence) may be that
uncertain individuals, given their negative outlook, are more vulnerable to anger and less
capable of coping with it. This “vulnerability” explanation cannot account for why
uncertain people want to experience anger. It also cannot account for why only uncertain
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people who want to reduce their uncertainty would show these effects (i.e., why would
only people high on need for closure not be able to cope effectively with anger?).
Given that these results provided the first experimental evidence for my model, I
sought to replicate them in Study 3. I was interested in whether the interaction effects on
the anger DVs would replicate, and also whether the effects on the sadness DVs would
replicate. Before investing in trying to further tease apart anger and sadness with a new
experimental paradigm, I wanted to determine what effects are reliable and replicable.
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CHAPTER 4
STUDY 3: REPLICATION OF STUDY 2
Study 3 aimed to replicate Study 2, using the exact same manipulations, measures
and procedures, with a few minor changes. Given that in Study 2 I learned that
participants in the control condition responded similarly to participants in the high
certainty condition, and given resource constraints, we did not run a control condition in
Study 3. In addition, I was unable to recruit participants from the prescreen for Study 3
due to a shortage of students willing to participate in the study, so I did not obtain a
measure of need for cognitive closure before the study. Instead, I measured need for
cognitive closure at the end of the study, immediately after the measure of ideal affect
and before the measure of knowledge about the link between anger and certainty. Thus,
the placement of both need for cognitive closure and knowledge about the cognitive
consequences of anger was altered: need for cognitive closure was measured after the
uncertainty manipulation, anger induction, and key dependent variables; the knowledge
item now came after (and could have been influenced by) need for cognitive closure.
Participants
A total of 149 student participants took part in the lab study in exchange for extra
course credit. I excluded six participants who did not follow instructions on the writing
task constituting the manipulation, five participants who did not watch the entire angerinducing video, and five outliers on the measure of anger felt after the video (they were
below the midpoint of the scale and over 2 SDs below the mean), leaving 133 participants
in the final sample (25 males, 105 females, 1 unreported). These were the same exclusion
criteria used in Study 2. Importantly for the purposes of replication, Study 3 included a
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greater number of participants in the uncertainty and certainty conditions than Study 2
did.
Measures
The measures were the same as those in Study 2, with the exception of need for
cognitive closure, which was measured after the ideal affect items and before the
knowledge item.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4, below, displays the means and standard deviations for all measures
across conditions, as well as reliability estimates for the composite scores.
Measure
Emotions after the video
Disgusted
Sad
Angry
Upset
Frustrated
Irritated
Agitated
Anxious
Afraid
Happy
Excited
Anger at the perpetrators
2-item anger composite
Intentions to engage in angerprolonging behaviors
Ideal affect
Happy
Sad
Angry
Fearful
Need for cognitive closure
Beliefs about the link between
anger and certainty
Manipulation Checks
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M

SD

α

8.53
7.96
7.92
7.87
6.86
6.36
6.31
5.49
4.99
1.20
1.19
8.10
8.01
5.18

1.03
1.50
1.29
1.60
2.02
2.26
2.31
2.51
2.57
0.61
0.70
1.24
1.15
1.85

.79
.72

6.98
2.24
2.55
1.95
4.29
4.59

2.68
2.22
2.57
1.93
0.96
1.45

.74

Uncertainty composite
Certain
Confident
Doubtful
Negative affect composite
Sad
Fearful
Angry
Anxious

3.23
4.73
4.79
3.21
2.76
2.77
2.74
2.06
3.45

1.74
1.96
1.88
1.88
1.39
1.82
1.76
1.43
1.99

.90

.81

Table 4. Means, standard deviations, and reliability estimates for main measures in Study
3.
Manipulation Checks
The manipulation had the anticipated effects on the uncertainty manipulation
check composite variable, F(2,132) = 199.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .603. Participants reported
feeling more uncertain in the uncertainty condition (M = 4.57, SD = 1.33) than in the
certainty condition (M = 1.88, SD = 0.80).
The manipulation also influenced negative affect, F(2,131) = 59.06, p < .001, ηp2
= .311. Upon reflecting back on the writing task, participants’ reported having
experienced more negative affect in the uncertainty condition (M = 3.53, SD = 1.33)
compared to the certainty condition (M = 1.98, SD = 0.95).
I also analyzed anger as a single item. In contrast to Study 2, where no difference
emerged between conditions on anger participants reported feeling during the
manipulation, participants reported more anger in the uncertainty condition (M = 2.43,
SD = 1.49) compared to the certainty condition (M = 1.68, SD = 1.27), F(2,131) = 9.80, p
= .002, ηp2 = .070.
Main Effects of Certainty Manipulation on Key Dependent Variables
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No main effects of the certainty manipulation emerged on any of the dependent
variables, p’s > .22.
Moderation by Individual Differences in Motivation and Knowledge
Again, I tested for moderation by need for cognitive closure. No interactions
consistent with my hypotheses emerged, either on the anger or the sadness variables, p’s
> .09.
I also tested for moderation by the item assessing knowledge of the association
between anger and certainty, which itself was unaffected by the manipulation, F(2,131) =
1.84, p = .177. I reasoned that people who are aware of the potential for anger to elicit a
sense of certainty should demonstrate especially strong preferences for anger when they
are under a state of uncertainty. Supporting this idea, a significant interaction emerged
between this knowledge and the effect of the manipulation on intentions to engage in
anger-prolonging behaviors given 15 minutes of free time (i.e., searching the internet for
more information about the event, voicing one’s anger on social media, talking to friends
about the event), F(3,129) = 3.48, b = -.53, SE = .22, p = .017, ηp2 = .043 (see Figure 4).
Participants in the uncertainty condition intended to engage in more anger-prolonging
behaviors than participants in the certainty condition, but only when they were aware that
anger is associated with a sense of certainty, b = -.93, SE = .44, p = .039, and not when
they were unaware that anger is associated with certainty, b = .59, SE = .44, p = .183.
Knowledge had no relationship with anger-prolonging behaviors when certainty was
high, b = -.03, SE = .15, p = .854, but it was positively associated with anger-prolonging
behaviors when certainty was low, b = -.50, SE = .16, p = .002. This suggests that people
intend to engage in anger-prolonging behaviors when 1) they lack certainty and 2) know
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that anger can provide it, providing support for the proposed motivational mechanism
through which people seek out anger to restore feelings of certainty.

Anger-Prolonging Behaviors

Certainty by Knowledge Interaction
7

6
Uncertainty
Control
5

4
Low Awareness of
High Awareness of CertaintyCertainty-Anger Association
Anger Association

Figure 4. The effects of uncertainty and beliefs about the association between anger and
certainty on anger-prolonging behaviors.
Covariates
Given that negative affect and anger experienced during the manipulation differed
across conditions, I controlled for these variables in the test of the knowledge by
condition interaction on anger-prolonging behaviors, and the results remained essentially
unchanged.
Discussion
Study 3 failed to replicate the primary findings of Study 2 (namely the need for
cognitive closure by condition interactions on anger preferences and experience). Yet it
provided a partial conceptual replication in revealing a knowledge by condition
interaction on intentions to engage in anger-prolonging behaviors.
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Several factors could have contributed to the discrepancies in results. Study 3 did
not employ a pre-study measure of need for cognitive closure as Study 2 had. Thus,
participants’ completion of the uncertainty manipulation, anger writing task, and
dependent measures, could have influenced their need for closure responses in intricate
ways (perhaps leading them to overthink their responses given the thematically similar
tasks they just completed) that would change the meaning of the measure. Importantly,
this would not change the mean level of need for cognitive closure (which did not differ
across conditions, F[1,131] = 1.26, p = .26, ηp2 = .010), as participants could shift in both
directions. One plausible hypothesis for how this could occur is that participants who had
just sought out anger in order to resolve their uncertainty may not want to admit that they
dislike and cannot tolerate uncertainty (admitting this could make them uncomfortable)
and thus they might lower their need for cognitive closure reports. I tested this hypothesis
by testing the interaction between the manipulation and intentions to prolong anger on
need for cognitive closure. Though the interaction did not reach significance, F(2,129) =
2.74, p = .100, ηp2 = .021, among participants in the low certainty condition, those who
intended to engage in anger-prolonging behaviors also tended to have lower need for
cognitive closure, b = -.21, SE = .12, p = .073. This relationship did not exist in the high
certainty condition, b = .07, SE = .12, p = .578. Thus, it is possible that this social
desirability concern altered the validity of the need for cognitive closure measure when
assessed at the end of the study. One other potential difference between this replication
study and the original study is that the replication study was run entirely during the last
two weeks of the semester (with the majority of participants run during the last week of
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the semester), whereas no participants in the original study were run within the last 6
weeks of the semester.
In sum, although the need for cognitive closure interactions may have failed to
replicate for methodological reasons, Study 3 nonetheless provided conceptual support
for my hypotheses by demonstrating that when people are aware of the link between
anger and certainty, they intend to prolong anger when coping with uncertainty. The
notion that people who are motivated to reduce uncertainty should also show strong
preferences for anger should not be ruled out based on this study alone, and will be tested
again in the subsequent studies.
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CHAPTER 5
STUDY 4: ANGER IN RESPONSE TO A LIFE EXPERIENCE
Study 4 sought to conceptually replicate the earlier findings using a similar
manipulation of uncertainty but a different anger-evoking paradigm, in order to begin to
generalize these effects to a variety of different anger-eliciting contexts. In fact, in Study
4, I allowed participants to select an anger-eliciting experience to write about from their
own lives. This served as both an anger induction and a dependent variable (as I could
measure how much participants wrote about the experience). This paradigm also ensures
that all participants think about an event that they believe is primarily anger-evoking.
This ameliorates the limitation of Study 2, whereby people who were motivated to reduce
uncertainty expressed a stronger preference for anger, but also a stronger preference for
sadness, likely because the anger-inducing video they saw also contained high levels of
sadness, which, given the content of the video, was hard to separate from anger (i.e.,
participants would accept the sadness to experience the anger). Study 4’s paradigm
allows for a clearer distinction between anger and other negative emotions to be made
and reduces the conflation of anger with other emotions.
Study 4 also introduced a new methodological feature that has the potential to
strengthen the ability of the study to test my theoretical perspective. That is, Study 4
introduces a time delay between the manipulation of uncertainty and the anger induction.
Although, in some research areas, a greater time interval between the independent
variable and the dependent variable can weaken experimental effects, research and
theorizing about non-emotional forms of compensatory reactions to uncertainty suggests
that delay between the IV and DV can strengthen motivated reactions to uncertainty.
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Such findings are thought to emerge because individuals’ immediate reaction is to try to
inhibit their motivated reactions to the threat of uncertainty (Burke, Martens, & Faucher,
2010; Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011; Wichman, Brunner, & Weary, 2008). Thus, I
expected that the delay should actually make it more likely to find effects to the extent
that they emerge for motivational reasons.
Participants
A total of 366 participants participated in the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk
in exchange for $0.75. I obtained a large sample because I anticipated that a number of
participants would not fully comply with the numerous writing tasks they that would be
asked to complete, and because I anticipated a good deal of non-systematic variance
stemming from the open-ended nature of many of the tasks. I excluded 50 participants
who did not follow instructions on the uncertainty manipulation, the distraction task, the
brief listing of anger/fear/sadness life events, or the anger induction writing task (see
below for details about these tasks), one participant who experienced technical
difficulties while completing the study, 15 participants who took a substantially shorter or
longer time to complete the study than the remainder of the sample (i.e., less than 10
minutes or greater than 60 minutes, with the mean time to complete the study, without
excluding these participants, being 20.19 minutes; SD = 15.58), and five participants who
reported not taking the study seriously, leaving 295 participants in the final sample (116
males, 174 females, 3 “other,” 2 did not report gender). The number of exclusions was
comparable to other MTurk studies (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014) and was
reasonable given the several demanding writing tasks.
Procedure
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Participants were recruited to participate in a study on “autobiographical memory
and information processing” in which they would “write about several life experiences”
to help us better understand “how people process information about their lives.”
Participants were randomly assigned to write about an experience in which they felt
uncertain, certain, or neither (in a control condition).
The manipulations were very similar to the ones used in Study 2, but both the
instructions and the time limit were shortened to be better suited for an online format, as
online participants tend to expect brief, simple tasks. The instructions for the
uncertainty/certainty conditions were as follows:
In this first task, we are interested in the types of
experiences people associate with [uncertainty and doubt /
certainty and confidence]. To help us address this question,
we would like you to write about something (such as an
event or a belief) you currently feel [uncertain or doubtful /
certain or confident] about. Please write, in as much detail
as possible, what it is that you feel [uncertain / certain]
about, why you are [uncertain / certain] about it, and how
you feel as a result of this experience. Please describe this
experience in as much detail as possible. Please write for at
least 3 minutes. The continue button will appear below
after 3 minutes have elapsed.
In the control condition, participants were asked to write about a typical
experience in their lives:
In this first task, we are interested in the types of
experiences people have in everyday life. To help us
address this question, we would like you to write about a
typical experience in your life. Please take a few moments
to think about an ordinary and typical life
experience. Please describe this experience in as much
detail as possible. Please write for at least 3 minutes. The
continue button will appear after 3 minutes have elapsed.
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Next, participants completed a distractor task for about 2 minutes, in which they
were asked to list as many states and cities as they could. This allowed for a stricter test
of my ideas while also providing additional support my theoretical rationale. On average,
incorporating the time spent on all instructions and questions, 4.69 minutes (SD = 2.22)
elapsed between the end of the uncertainty manipulation and the beginning of the anger
writing task. This is consistent with past research, which has successfully observed
compensatory reactions to uncertainty with time delays ranging from 3-10 minutes (e.g.,
Nash, McGregor, & Prentice, 2011). The death anxiety literature similarly finds strong
effects of mortality salience after delays lasting as long as 20 minutes (Burke, Martens, &
Faucher, 2010).
Next, I assessed participants’ preferences for experiencing a variety of negative
emotions (i.e., anger, fear, and sadness). To ensure that participants thought concretely
and vividly about an emotionally evocative experience (which they would later express
their preferences for writing more about), I asked participants to briefly generate possible
topics to write about for the writing task to follow. Specifically, they were told:
In the next task, we are interested in how people describe
life experiences in which they have felt specific emotions,
such as sadness, anger, or fear.
Before you complete this writing task, you will be given
the opportunity to indicate the type of emotional experience
you would like to write about. Click continue to proceed.
In the upcoming writing task, you will be asked to write for
several minutes about a personal life experience in which
you felt a specific emotion.
First, however, we would like you to generate a possible
life experience that you might write about for each of the
emotions listed below.
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Please think about experiences you had recently (within the
past year or so) that made you feel each of the following
emotions. Then, in a brief sentence, please describe an
experience for each emotion type.
Participants listed experiences in which they felt anger, fear, and sadness. Then,
on the following page, their responses reappeared, and they were asked to rate the extent
to which they wanted to write about each of the three experiences to a greater extent
using 9-point scales (Not at all interested – Very interested). Specifically, they were told:
Next, you will see the experiences you generated on the
previous page. Please indicate the extent to which are you
interested in writing about each of the following
experiences for the upcoming full-length writing task:
Next, to ensure that all participants experienced anger, I told participants, as a
cover story, that while their ratings will be taken into account, the emotion they write
about during the full length writing task will also be determined by an element of chance.
Then, all participants were asked to write about an experience in which they felt angry,
and were told to write as much as they wanted:
On the next page, you will receive your writing prompt.
Please note that because we are looking to obtain a
sampling of experiences from each type of emotion, you
might not be asked to write about the emotion you
indicated the strongest preference for. Because we want a
somewhat even sampling of each emotion type, an
algorithm will generate an emotion for you to write about
based on the preferences you expressed as well as an
element of chance.
Click continue to receive your writing prompt and begin
the writing task.
Based on your responses, as well as an element of chance,
you were assigned to write about a life experience in which
you felt angry.

46

In the space below, please write about a recent personal life
experience in which you felt angry. You can write about
the same experience you briefly described earlier, or you
can write about a different experience.
Be sure to describe what you were/are angry about, why
you were/are angry about it, and how it made/makes
you feel. Please describe this in as much detail as
possible.
There is no timer for this task. Write as much as you feel is
necessary to fully describe the experience. Click the
continue button below when you are done writing.
Measures
After the anger induction, the following measures were obtained.
Anger writing task word count. As an indirect and unobtrusive index of
engaging in behaviors that prolong the experience of anger, I computed the length of each
participant’s written response (using a word count function).
Emotions. Immediately after the anger induction, participants were asked to
indicate the extent to which they “currently feel” the following emotions a 9-point scale
(1 = Not at all, 9 = Very much): Angry, Sad, Afraid, Happy, Upset, Anxious, Furious,
Excited, Confident, Disgusted, Hostile, Frustrated.
Anger up-regulation. After rating their emotions, participants rated the extent to
which they attempted to up-regulate their anger during the anger writing induction on a 9point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = A great deal): “As you were writing about an experience
that made you angry, to what extent did you think about the experience in a way
that increased the anger you were feeling?”
Anticipated rumination. As a measure of anticipated rumination, participants
were asked, “If you had 15 minutes of free time, how likely would you be to keep
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thinking about the event that made you angry?” on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all likely, 9
= Extremely likely).
Beliefs about the link between anger and certainty. Participants responded to
the same question assessing their awareness of the association between anger and
certainty as in Studies 2 and 3.
Need for cognitive closure. Need for cognitive closure was measured at the end
of the study using the 14-item measure used in Study 2 (α = .91). In this study, a 6-point
scale was used (1 = Strongly disagree, 6 = Strongly agree)
Manipulation check. Participants indicated the extent to which they felt the
following emotions during the first writing task, in which they wrote about a life
experience in which they felt certain and confident / uncertain and doubtful using a 9point scale (Not at all – Very much): certain, confident, uncertain, doubtful, sad, fearful,
angry, anxious. Because there were several writing tasks in this study, I displayed
participants’ actual responses back to them at the top of the screen, to remind them which
task I was referring to.
The first four items were averaged to form a composite measure of uncertainty (α
= .95). The latter four items were averaged to form a composite measure of negative
affect (α = .90).
Results
Descriptives
Table 5, below, displays the means and standard deviations for all measures
across conditions.
Measure
Preference for writing task
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M

SD

Anger
Sadness
Fear
Anger writing task word count
Emotions after the anger
writing task
Angry
Frustrated
Confident
Disgusted
Furious
Happy
Sad
Upset
Anxious
Hostile
Excited
Afraid
Anger up-regulation
Rumination
Need for cognitive closure
Beliefs about the link between
anger and certainty
Manipulation Checks
Uncertainty composite
Certain
Confident
Doubtful
Uncertain
Negative affect composite
Sad
Fearful
Angry
Anxious

4.83
4.76
4.63
103.64

2.73
2.76
2.64
60.09

5.36
5.35
4.70
4.48
4.26
4.24
4.11
4.90
4.08
3.87
3.34
2.63
5.44
3.80
4.13
5.20

2.69
2.93
2.42
2.83
2.84
2.45
2.63
2.66
2.57
2.64
2.25
2.15
2.38
2.42
0.83
2.34

3.73
6.03
6.16
3.40
3.70
3.16
3.16
3.10
2.64
3.72

2.59
2.80
2.67
2.76
2.92
2.25
2.55
2.58
2.31
2.80

Table 5. Means and standard deviations for main measures in Study 4.
Manipulation Check
The manipulation had the anticipated effect on ratings on the composite measure
of uncertainty, F(2,289) = 197.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .577. Participants reported feeling more
uncertain in the uncertainty condition (M = 6.37, SD = 2.16) compared to participants in
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the control condition (M = 2.57, SD = 1.57), p < .001, who felt more uncertain than
participants in the certainty condition (M = 1.98, SD = 1.10), p = .018.
The manipulation also influenced negative affect, F(2,289) = 69.70, p < .001, ηp2
= .325. Upon reflecting back on the writing task, participants’ reported having
experienced more negative affect in the uncertainty condition (M = 4.90, SD = 2.09)
compared to both the certainty condition (M = 2.21, SD = 1.70) and the control condition
(M = 2.21, SD = 1.73). The certainty and control conditions did not differ, p = .983.
A significant effect of the manipulation emerged on the single item assessing
anger experienced during the manipulation, F(2,288) = 15.56, p < .001, ηp2 = .098.
Participants reported more anger in the uncertainty condition (M = 3.60, SD = 2.64)
compared to both the certainty condition (M = 2.00, SD = 1.68), p < .001, and the control
condition (M = 2.20, SD = 2.10), p < .001, with no difference emerging between the
certainty and control conditions, p = .526.
Main Effects of Certainty Manipulation on Key Dependent Variables
Using one-way ANOVAs, I tested for main effects of the manipulation on the
extent to which they wanted to write about anger/fear/sadness during the writing task,
how much participants wrote on the anger writing task, the extent to which they reported
feeling angry after the anger writing task, the extent to which they attempted to upregulate their anger, and the extent to which they believed they would ruminate about
their anger given 15 minutes of free time.
Anger writing task word count. There was a significant effect of the
manipulation on the number of words participants wrote during the anger writing task,
F(2,292) = 3.51, p = .031, ηp2 = .024. Participants in the uncertainty condition (M =
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115.87, SD = 70.77) wrote more words during the anger writing task than participants in
the control condition (M = 94.64, SD = 52.11), p = .012, and marginally more words than
participants in the certainty condition (M = 99.78, SD = 53.16), p = .0611. The certainty
and control conditions did not differ, p = .551. This provided evidence that participants
exposed to uncertainty behaved in ways that prolonged their experience of anger.
Anger. I next tested the effect of the manipulation on anger reported after the
induction. A trend emerged, F(2,291) = 1.89, p = .152, ηp2 = .013. Participants in the
uncertainty condition (M = 5.76, SD = 2.64) reported feeling marginally more anger than
participants in the control condition (M = 5.06, SD = 2.83), p = .061, and nonsignificantly
more anger than participants in the certainty condition (M = 5.25, SD = 2.56), p = .181.
The certainty and control conditions did not differ, p = .622. Although not significant, the
direction of these effects are consistent with my hypotheses, and suggest that people
exposed to uncertainty may feel more angry compared to people not exposed to
uncertainty.
Anger up-regulation. There was a significant effect of the certainty/uncertainty
manipulation on anger up-regulation, F(2,291) = 4.71, p = .001, ηp2 = .032. Participants
in the uncertainty condition (M = 5.97, SD = 2.14) reported attempting to up-regulate
their anger to a greater extent than participants in the certainty condition (M = 5.34, SD =
2.23), p = .003, and to a marginally greater extent than participants in the control
1

Given that a marginal effect of the manipulation emerged on the number of words
written during the manipulation writing task, F(2,292) = 2.36, p = .096, ηp2 = .016, I
controlled for number of words written during the manipulation, and the interaction
between this variable and condition (this could be interpreted as controlling for individual
differences in writing length). When controlling for these variables, the effect of the
manipulation on words written during the anger induction became nonsignficant,
F(2,289) = 1.96, p = .143, ηp2 = .013. Uncertain participants still wrote marginally more
words than certain participants, p = .096.
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condition (M = 4.96, SD = 2.65), p = .065. The certainty and control conditions did not
differ, p = .271. These findings illustrate that participants exposed to uncertainty reported
using cognitive emotion regulation strategies in an effort to increase the level of anger
they felt during the writing task.
Anticipated rumination. Finally, the manipulation influenced the extent to
which participants anticipated ruminating about their anger during 15 minutes of free
time, F(2,289) = 2.99, p = .052, ηp2 = .020. Participants in the uncertainty condition (M =
4.27, SD = 2.40) anticipated spending their time thinking about the anger-inducing event
to a significantly greater extent than participants in both the certainty (M = 3.49, SD =
2.41), p = .027, and control conditions (M = 3.60, SD = 2.40), p = .050. The certainty and
control conditions did not differ, p = .769. This suggests that people who are uncertain
believe they will spend more time thinking about their anger than people who are not
uncertain.
Mediation. I tested whether people in the uncertainty condition experienced more
anger because they up-regulated their anger (Hayes, 2013; model 4). As predicted, the
difference in anger in the uncertainty and certainty conditions was mediated by reported
cognitive up-regulation of anger during the anger writing task, b = -.3386, SE = .1735,
95% CI [-.6885, -.0068]. The difference in anger in the uncertainty and control conditions
was similarly mediated by anger up-regulation, b = -.5613, SE = .1892, 95% CI [-.9537, .0399]. This provides evidence that participants in the uncertainty condition not only
reported up-regulating their anger to a greater extent than participants in the other two
conditions, but they also actually felt more angry as a result of this up-regulation.
Moderation by Individual Differences in Motivation and Knowledge
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No effects of the manipulation emerged on either need for closure, p = .247, or
knowledge of the link between anger and certainty, p = .466, allowing me to treat these
variables as moderators of the effects of the manipulation on the dependent measures.
However, no interaction effects emerged. This suggests that, in this study, uncertainty led
to greater preferences for and experiences of anger irrespective of motivation to reduce
uncertainty or awareness of the notion that anger can provide certainty. Thus, perhaps
this phenomenon is more general and occurs even among participants who do not
explicitly report wanting certainty or knowing that anger can provide it.
Covariates
Once again, given that negative affect experienced during the certainty
manipulation differed across conditions, I reran the analyses controlling for negative
affect. Controlling for negative affect and its interaction with condition led the effects
described above on the amount written during the anger task, anger experience, anger upregulation, and anticipated rumination to become nonsignificant. These analyses should
be interpreted with caution, as it is possible that if the experimental conditions differed so
systematically on negative affect, controlling for it could have essentially partialled out
the very effects of the conditions themselves. See General Discussion for a full discussion
of this issue.
Discussion
Study 4 demonstrated that participants who are uncertain (compared to those who
are not uncertain) spend more time writing about an anger-inducing experience, report
attempting to amplify the anger they felt during this experience, anticipate ruminating
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more about this experience, and actually feel more angry as a result of their amplification
efforts.
Despite this support for my hypothesis that people who are uncertain are
motivated to feel anger, the results of Study 4 differed from those in Studies 2 and 3.
Methodological differences may help to begin to explain the discrepancies. Study 4 used
a different experimental paradigm from the one used in Studies 2 and 3. Although
participants in all studies wrote about either an uncertain or certain life experience,
participants in Study 4 generated their own anger experience to think about, whereas
participants in Studies 2 and 3 were all exposed to the same anger-inducing video. Study
4 also introduced a time delay to the paradigm. Of course, using the existing data, it is not
possible to pinpoint the reason for the discrepancy in effects. In Study 4, the effects were
constant across individual difference variables, yet in Studies 2 and 3 the effects were
contingent on these moderating variables. However, it is plausible that the anger task,
which was tailored to each individual and thus likely stronger for each participant, as well
as the time delay, which prior theorizing suggests could allow time for stronger
compensatory reactions to uncertainty to emerge, enhanced the ability of this paradigm to
detect effects across all participants. Future research on this topic should use the anger
writing paradigm and a time delay to confirm this speculation.
It is also possible that certain methodological factors attenuated the ability of this
study to detect the moderation effects. Like Study 3 (and unlike Study 2), need for
cognitive closure was measured at the end of the study. Thus, as in Study 3, it is possible
that the content of the study (which includes thinking about uncertainty/certainty and
anger) could have influenced responses on the need for cognitive closure measure. Future
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research should measure need for cognitive closure prior to the study, as was done in
Study 2. As we await additional research, Study 5 offers another solution to the need for
cognitive closure measurement problem: manipulating need for cognitive closure.
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CHAPTER 6
STUDY 5: MANIPULATING UNCERTAINTY INTOLERANCE
Study 1 found correlational evidence of an association between wanting to reduce
uncertainty and tendencies to experience anger. Studies 2-4 manipulated uncertainty and
found initial evidence suggesting that people who are uncertain are more likely than
people who are not uncertain to prefer and feel angry. However, in Study 2, this effect
only emerged among people who were motivated to reduce uncertainty. In Study 4, the
effect emerged across all participants, but the assumption was still that participants
became angry in an effort to reduce uncertainty. Therefore, in Study 5, I decided to
directly manipulate the desire to reduce uncertainty. By directly manipulating the
theorized motivational mechanism, this experimental paradigm is uniquely and
parsimoniously able to test the core theoretical components of my perspective: that
wanting to reduce uncertainty drives preferences for anger.
In Study 5, I asked participants in two experimental conditions to think about
something that currently makes them feel uncertain, and manipulated whether
participants believed that reducing and getting rid of uncertainty or embracing and
tolerating uncertainty is healthy and adaptive. Participants were provided with ostensible
scientific evidence on the matter and were asked to write about ways they could either
reduce or tolerate a significant source of uncertainty in their lives. I was interested in
whether a subtle difference in how people think about managing uncertainty would
influence preferences for anger. I predicted that participants who adopted a mindset of
uncertainty intolerance would seek out anger to compensate for uncertainty whereas
those who see the benefits of uncertainty tolerance would not.
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Study 5’s paradigm provides a true experimental test of the notion that
uncertainty-driven anger preferences stem from a desire to reduce uncertainty, without
needing to rely on individual difference measures. Even if measured prior to the study,
treating need for cognitive closure as an individual difference moderator allows for the
possibility that some third variable that is related to need for cognitive closure (e.g., a
general orientation toward negativity) is responsible for why uncertainty increases anger
when need for cognitive closure was high. The freedom from individual difference
measures also overcomes the problem identified in Studies 2-4, whereby measured need
for cognitive closure moderated condition effects only when assessed weeks before the
study (as in Study 2) and not when assessed at the end of the study (as in Studies 3 and
4). One additional benefit of this paradigm is that it helps rule out a possible alternative
explanation for the effects observed in the earlier studies. As discussed earlier,
uncertainty is often associated with a sense of negativity, which may make individuals
vulnerable to, or less capable of coping with, anger. All of the evidence for a motivational
mechanism accumulated in the earlier studies (e.g., effects on preferences for anger, not
just experience of anger, and moderation by need for cognitive closure and knowledge of
the potential for anger to restore certainty) speaks against alternative explanation.
However, Study 5 allowed for the accumulation of further evidence against vulnerability
as a possible mechanism by holding negative affect constant, by asking participants in
both experimental conditions to think about uncertainty, and simply manipulating how
they believed they should deal with it.
Study 5 also used yet another type of anger induction – reading an anger-inducing
article about ISIS. This paradigm allows for a standardized anger induction across
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participants and allows converging evidence to be obtained for my model using different
methodologies. Further, the content of the article (i.e., intergroup conflict) lent itself to
exploring the potential downstream implications of compensatory anger preferences. That
is, it allowed me to test whether people who become angry while attempting to eliminate
uncertainty in turn display more bias toward outgroup members. Prior work has shown
that both anger (Sadler, Lineberger, Correll, & Park, 2005; Skitka, Bauman, Aramovich,
Morgan, 2006) and uncertainty (Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010; Hogg & Adelman,
2013; Orehek et al., 2010) are independently associated with outgroup hostility. The
present work therefore tested whether it might be possible to integrate these independent
strands of research and demonstrate that anger mediates the effects of uncertainty on
outgroup bias.
Participants
A total of 292 participants participated in the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk
in exchange for $0.75. I excluded 23 participants who did not follow instructions on the
uncertainty intolerance manipulation (they either did not provide a reasonable response to
the prompt or wrote less than 15 words, despite being asked to write for 2 minutes; see
full task instructions below), 17 participants who spent less than 15 seconds reading the
anger induction article or could not adequately summarize the main theme of the article,
24 who got fewer than three out of four attention check questions correct, one who took
substantially shorter to complete the study than the rest of the sample (this participant
took 5.22 minutes while the mean duration was 15.16 minutes; SD = 11.53), five who
reported not taking the study seriously, and three who completed the study on a mobile
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phone, leaving 219 participants in the final sample (94 males, 118 females, 3 “other,” 4
unreported).
Procedure
Participants were recruited to participate in a study on “autobiographical memory
and information processing” to help us better understand “how people process
information about their lives and the world around them.” Participants were randomly
assigned to one of three experimental conditions (uncertainty intolerance, uncertainty
tolerance, and control). Participants in the control condition were asked to write for 2
minutes about a typical life experience:
In the first task, we are interested in people's
autobiographical memories, and would like you to write
about an ongoing life experience. In particular, we are
interested in the types of experiences people have in
everyday life. Please take a few moments to think about an
ordinary and typical life experience. Then, please write
about the experience. Please write for at least 2
minutes. The continue button will appear after 2 minutes
have elapsed.
Participants in both the uncertainty intolerance and uncertainty tolerance
conditions were all asked to first briefly describe a current significant source of
uncertainty in their lives:
In the first task, we are interested in people's
autobiographical memories, and would like you to write
about an ongoing life experience. In particular, we are
interested in an experience that you currently feel uncertain
or doubtful about. Please take a few moments to think
about something that is currently a significant source of
uncertainty in your life. Then, in a few sentences, please
describe the experience.
Next, participants in the uncertainty intolerance/tolerance conditions were
informed about ostensible research demonstrating the value of reducing/accepting
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uncertainty and were asked to write about ways they could reduce/accept their
uncertainty in connection to the experience they just wrote about for at least one minute:
Research demonstrates that it is very important to try to
[reduce and get rid of / accept and come to terms with]
uncertainty in one’s life. Decades of psychological research
demonstrates that [feeling uncertain is detrimental to
psychological functioning / being able to embrace
uncertainty is key for adaptive psychological functioning].
Meanwhile, [reducing levels of uncertainty / accepting or
embracing uncertainty] to the point where people feel
[certain / at ease with their uncertainty] has been shown to
lead to increased life satisfaction and greater productivity.
Please think about the experience that is making you feel
uncertain. Then think about ways you can [reduce / be
more at ease with] your uncertainty about the experience.
Please write about what you can do to try to [reduce /
accept] the feelings of uncertainty that you feel in
connection to the experience you described earlier. Please
write for at least 1 minute. The continue button will appear
below after 1 minute has elapsed.
Thus, all participants wrote about a significant source of uncertainty except for
those in the control condition. Although participants in the control condition only
completed one writing task and participants in the uncertainty intolerance/tolerance
conditions completed two writing tasks, the time I asked participants to spend writing
was roughly the same (two minutes in the control condition, briefly describing a source
of uncertainty plus one minute managing it in the other two conditions).
Participants were told that “in the next task, we are interested in how people
process information while reading,” and that they would be asked to read a brief article
excerpt and answer questions about it. The article (see Figure 5), entitled “Despite
Losses, ISIS Continues to Target Civilians in the Middle East and Around the World,”
was formatted to look like a “New York Times” article. It described that despite
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territorial losses in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has carried out or inspired attacks that have killed
hundreds of civilians in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. It also described
the brutal tactics that ISIS has employed against civilians living under its rule, such as
using human shields and mutilating dead bodies. The content of the article was selected
based on the goal of maximizing its potential to elicit anger. The article discussed
immoral actions (using human shields, mutilating dead bodies) rather than death tolls or
stories about the lives of those affected by ISIS to mitigate sadness, and emphasized
territorial losses to mitigate fear.
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Figure 5. Anger induction article used in Study 5.
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Measures
After reading the anger-inducing article, participants completed the following
measures.
Emotions. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they “currently
feel” the following emotions a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Very much): Angry,
Afraid, Sad, Disgusted, Upset, Furious, Anxious, Happy, Excited, Irritated, Agitated,
Frustrated. In addition to considering anger as a single item, I created a composite score
averaging anger-related emotions that emerged as related in a factor analysis: Furious,
Frustrated, and Upset (α = .89).
Anti-Muslim bias. To assess the downstream consequences of anger resulting
from uncertainty intolerance and reading about ISIS, we assessed bias toward Muslims
using four items. One item assessed collective blame (“All Muslims are responsible for
the recent terrorist attacks”), two items were taken from Pratto & Glasford’s (2008) AntiArab scale (“ People of Middle Eastern descent should have to carry special
identification,” “People of the Muslim religion tend to be fanatical”) and one item was
developed for this study (“Refugees from Arab countries should not be allowed to enter
the United States”; α = .89).
Beliefs about the link between anger and certainty. Knowledge of the link
between anger and certainty was measured the same way as in Studies 2-4.
Need for cognitive closure. Need for cognitive closure was measured at the end
of the study using the 14-item measure used in Studies 2, 4, and 5 (α = .92).
Manipulation checks. To assess differences between conditions on uncertainty
and negative affect, participants indicated the extent to which they felt the following
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emotions during the manipulation: certain, confident, uncertain, doubtful, sad, fearful,
angry, anxious. Again, participants’ writing task responses were displayed to them at the
top of the screen as a reminder.
The first four items were averaged to form a composite measure of uncertainty (α
= .94). The latter four items were averaged to form a composite measure of negative
affect (α = .84).
Attention checks. Four true/false questions assessed the extent to which
participants paid sufficient attention to the anger induction article: “The article discussed
Iran's nuclear weapon's program,” “The article discussed recent terrorist attacks around
the world,” “The article mentioned a speech given by President Obama,” “The article
mentioned that ISIS was using human shields.”
Results
Descriptives
Table 6, below, displays the means and standard deviations for all measures
across conditions.
Measure
Emotions after the anger
article
Disgusted
Sad
Angry
Upset
Frustrated
Furious
Agitated
Irritated
Afraid
Anxious
Happy
Excited
Anger-related emotion
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M

SD

6.77
6.36
6.32
6.30
5.86
5.63
5.46
5.35
4.53
4.50
2.14
1.99
5.94

2.45
2.44
2.48
2.39
2.57
2.71
2.65
2.66
2.57
2.56
1.84
1.72
2.31

composite
Anti-Muslim Bias
Beliefs about the link between
anger and certainty
Need for cognitive closure
Manipulation Checks
Uncertainty composite
Certain
Confident
Doubtful
Uncertain
Negative affect composite
Sad
Fearful
Angry
Anxious

2.90
5.57

2.14
2.02

6.02

1.44

3.97
3.96
3.87
3.89
4.18
3.45
3.64
3.28
2.74
4.13

2.29
2.38
2.40
2.50
2.62
2.00
2.48
2.35
2.17
2.68

Table 6. Means and standard deviations for main measures in Study 5.
Manipulation Check
The manipulation influenced scores on the composite measure of uncertainty
experienced during the manipulation, F(2,212) = 27.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .207. Importantly,
the uncertainty intolerance (M = 4.88, SD = 2.24) and uncertainty tolerance (M = 5.73,
SD = 2.13) conditions did not differ in how much certainty they elicited, p = .688.
However, both of these conditions elicited greater uncertainty than the control condition
(M = 2.68, SD = 1.81), both p’s < .001. This confirms that both the uncertainty
intolerance and tolerance conditions induced similar levels of uncertainty.
The three conditions differed in how much negative affect they elicited during the
manipulation, F(2,212) = 27.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .207. Again, the uncertainty intolerance
(M = 4.18, SD = 1.74) and uncertainty tolerance (M = 4.17, SD = 1.95) conditions did not
differ in how much negative affect they elicited, p = .969. Yet both of these conditions
elicited greater negative affect than the control condition (M = 1.81, SD = 1.69), both p’s
< .001.
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The three conditions also differed in how much anger they elicited during the
manipulation, F(2,211) = 6.84, p = .001, ηp2 = .061, but, once again, the uncertainty
intolerance (M = 3.10, SD = 2.21) and uncertainty tolerance (M = 3.23, SD = 2.29)
conditions did not differ in how much anger they elicited, p = .715. Yet both of these
conditions elicited greater negative affect than the control condition (M = 2.08, SD =
1.88), both p’s < .005.
Although need for cognitive closure is traditionally used as a stable, trait measure,
there was some evidence that responses may have been influenced by the uncertainty
tolerance manipulation. The overall effect of the uncertainty intolerance manipulation on
the 14 item need for cognitive closure measure was not significant, F(2,212) = 1.15, p =
.319, ηp2 = .011. Yet, a trend emerged whereby participants in the uncertainty intolerance
condition (M = 6.09, SD = 1.53) scored higher on need for cognitive closure than
participants in the uncertainty tolerance condition (M = 5.68, SD = 1.39), p = .134. The
control condition (M = 5.84, SD = 1.72) fell in between these conditions and did not
significantly differ from either one (p’s > .33). It is perhaps not surprising that need for
cognitive closure was not significantly affected by the manipulation, as the measure is
traditionally used as a trait measure, and prior research attempting to manipulate need for
closure did not report a manipulation check (Orehek, 2009). Still, the face validity of the
manipulation, coupled with trending effects on the need for cognitive closure measure,
point to the effectiveness of the manipulation in inducing uncertainty
tolerance/intolerance.
Main Effects of Uncertainty Intolerance Manipulation on Key Dependent Variables
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Using one-way ANOVAs, I tested for main effects of the uncertainty intolerance
manipulation on feelings of anger experienced after reading the anger-eliciting article.
Anger. A marginally significant effect of the manipulation emerged on anger
reported after reading the article, F(2,216) = 2.53, p = .082, ηp2 = .013. Participants in the
uncertainty tolerance condition (M = 5.81, SD = 2.78) reported feeling significantly less
anger than participants in the uncertainty intolerance condition (M = 6.72, SD = 2.64), p =
.033. Participants in the uncertainty tolerance condition also reported experiencing
marginally less anger than participants in the control condition (M = 6.48, SD = 2.39), p =
.097. Participants in the control and uncertainty intolerance conditions did not differ, p =
.543.
Similar effects emerged on a composite measure of emotions experienced after
the article that are related to anger (i.e., furious, upset, frustrated). A significant effect of
the manipulation emerged on this composite score, F(2,216) = 3.41, p = .035, ηp2 = .031.
Again, participants in the uncertainty tolerance condition (M = 5.40, SD = 2.53) reported
feeling significantly less anger-related emotions than participants in the uncertainty
intolerance condition (M = 6.41, SD = 1.89), p = .011. Participants in the uncertainty
tolerance condition felt marginally less anger than participants in the control condition (M
= 6.01, SD = 2.35), p = .093. Participants in the control and uncertainty intolerance
conditions did not differ, p = .303.
These findings demonstrate that when the benefits of reducing uncertainty are
made salient (i.e., as in the uncertainty intolerance condition), people react to an angereliciting situation similarly to how they would react under typical conditions (i.e., as in
the control condition). However, when the benefits of accepting uncertainty are made
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salient – that is, when people are motivated to attempt to accept uncertainty – their levels
of anger are reduced. This provides experimental evidence for the notion that a
motivation to reduce uncertainty drives people to feel angry.
Anti-Muslim Bias. Given that anger was higher in the uncertainty intolerance
than the uncertainty tolerance condition, and both uncertainty intolerance and anger have
been shown in past research to contribute to intergroup bias, I tested the effect of the
manipulation on anti-Muslim bias to begin to determine whether anger might mediate the
effect of uncertainty intolerance on bias. A marginally significant effect of the
manipulation emerged on anti-Muslim bias, F(2,215) = 2.83, p = .061, ηp2 = .026.
However, the pattern of effects differed from the effects on anger. The uncertainty
intolerance (M = 3.06, SD = 2.19) and uncertainty tolerance conditions (M = 3.25, SD =
2.26) did not differ from each other, p = .595. However, the baseline condition (M = 2.47,
SD = 1.95) differed significantly from the uncertainty tolerance condition, p = .025, and
marginally from the uncertainty intolerance condition, p = .097. Thus, it appears that
simply experiencing uncertainty – irrespective of how people believed they should deal
with it – increased anti-Muslim bias. Thus, anger resulting from uncertainty intolerance is
not enough to account for the effects of uncertainty on bias.
Moderation by Individual Differences in Knowledge
No effects of the manipulation emerged on knowledge of the link between anger
and certainty, p = .929, allowing me to treat this as a moderator. However, no interaction
effects emerged p’s > .15.
Covariates
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As expected given that uncertainty was held constant across the uncertainty
intolerance and uncertainty tolerance conditions, controlling for negative affect elicited
during the manipulation did not attenuate the effects of the manipulation on anger or the
composite measure of anger-related emotions; in fact, controlling for negative affect
experienced during the manipulation (and its interaction with the manipulation) led to
stronger omnibus effects of the manipulation on anger, F(2,209) = 6.27, p = .002, ηp2 =
.057, and anger-related emotions, F(2,216) = 8.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .076.
Discussion
Study 5 provides evidence that the motivation to reduce uncertainty leads to
greater levels of anger than the motivation to tolerate uncertainty. Thus, consistent with
the evidence from the need for cognitive closure measure from Studies 1 and 2, Study 5
demonstrates that a desire to reduce uncertainty causally leads to greater anger. Study 5
also points toward a potential appraisal-based intervention that may prevent the onset of
anger at very early stages of the emotion generation process – encouraging people to
tolerate uncertainty.
Study 5 did not find clear evidence that compensatory anger responses mediate
the effect of uncertainty intolerance on intergroup bias. It is possible that uncertainty
intolerance/tolerance that is relevant to the intergroup conflict context would provide
different results than this study, which induced uncertainty intolerance/tolerance in one’s
personal life, disconnected from the intergroup conflict context. Although the effects of
the manipulation on the measure of need for cognitive closure were not significant, this is
likely due to a weak manipulation check (i.e., a trait measure) rather than a weak
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manipulation. Still, future research should develop more situational manipulation check
items.
Study 5 equated the experimental conditions on uncertainty and negative affect,
thereby helping to mitigate concerns that an alternative explanation can account for my
effects. Whereas Study 5 manipulated the desire to reduce uncertainty to isolate the
motivational variable driving these effects, Study 6, described next, manipulated
participants’ expectations that an anger-inducing stimulus could provide them with
certainty or not in an effort to provide experimental insight into the precise aspect of
anger that people are motivated to seek out.
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CHAPTER 7
STUDY 6: MANIPULATING ANTICIPATED CERTAINTY FROM ANGER
Studies 2-5 demonstrate that uncertainty leads people to seek out and feel anger –
particularly when people are motivated to reduce uncertainty (Studies 2 and 5) and are
knowledgeable about the certainty that can be embedded in anger (Study 3). Study 6
aimed to illustrate this mechanism in another way. To determine whether uncertainty
leads people to seek out anger in order to enhance certainty, Study 6 manipulated
uncertainty/certainty and then presented participants with an anger-inducing headline that
they were led to believe would make them feel either certain or uncertain about their
beliefs. Thus, by manipulating the perceived certainty embedded in anger, I aimed to
demonstrate that uncertain people only seek out anger when they believe it contains
certainty.
Based on the existing evidence, it remains possible that uncertainty leads people
to be motivated to seek out anger for reasons other than to attain certainty. Anger is also
associated with other appraisals (e.g., approach motivation, high arousal) that could
plausibly be sought out in an effort to alleviate uncertainty. Manipulating the anticipated
certainty in the to-be-selected anger-inducing stimulus allows for a demonstration that
certainty is the critical element of anger that is being sought out: it allows for a
demonstration that people who are uncertain choose anger when certainty is present and
do not choose anger when that single element of anger is not present. Such findings
would strengthen the broader theoretical position that people seek out specific emotions
for their specific appraisals.
Participants
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A total of 406 participants took part in a five minute study via Amazon
Mechanical Turk in exchange for either $0.20 or $0.30 (pay was increased after a slow
response rate). I excluded 36 participants who did not follow instructions on the
uncertainty manipulation (which is described in greater detail below), nine participants
who failed an attention check item (they were unable to identify the emotion that the
headline made previous participants feel), 13 participants who took a substantially shorter
or longer time to complete the study than the remainder of the sample (i.e., less than 4
minutes or grater than 30 minutes, with the mean time to complete the study, without
excluding these participants, being 7.14 minutes; SD = 3.35), three participants who
reported not taking the study seriously, and two participants who appeared to take a break
from the study immediately between the manipulation and the measures (based on
response timers), leaving 343 participants in the final sample (143 males, 199 females, 1
did not report gender).
Procedure
Participants were recruited to participate in a study on “autobiographical memory
and information processing” aimed at understanding “how people process information
about their lives and the news media.” Participants were randomly assigned to experience
uncertainty or certainty. The manipulation was identical to the one used in Study 4, but
asked participants to write for at least 2 minutes (rather than at least 3 minutes). I did not
include a control condition in this study.
After the manipulation, participants were told that in the next task “we are
interested in your attitudes toward the news media” and were given the following
instructions:
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In the next task, a random selection of participants will be
asked to read a news article.
We are interested in the extent to which you are interested
in reading a news article entitled:
"ISIS Leaders Call for More Attacks on Western
Targets"
In our previous research, participants read this article and
answered questions about it. We asked participants a) how
they felt after reading the article, and b) how
[certain/uncertain] they were of their beliefs after reading
the article.
Most participants in our previous studies reported
feeling:
a) angry and
b) [certain/uncertain] about their beliefs after reading
the article.
Participants then rated their level of interest in reading the article. I led
participants to believe that “a random selection” of participants would read an article so
that they would take it seriously, allowing for an ecologically valid measure of
preferences for anger. The information about previous participants was designed to lead
participants to anticipate that the article would either confirm their beliefs (certain
headline condition) or threaten their beliefs (uncertain headline condition).
Measures
Preference for anger article. After reading the headline for the ISIS article and
receiving the information about “previous participants’” experiences after reading the
article, participants were asked, “Using the scale below, please indicate how interested
you would be in reading this article.” Ratings were made on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at
all; 9 = Very much).
Need for cognitive closure. Need for cognitive closure was measured at the end
of the study as in Studies 3-5 (α = .91).
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Beliefs about the link between anger and certainty. Participants responded to
the same item assessing their awareness of the association between anger and certainty as
in Studies 2-5.
Manipulation check. Participants indicated the extent to which they felt the
following emotions during the writing manipulation using a 9-point scale (Not at all –
Very much): certain, confident, uncertain, doubtful, sad, angry, anxious.
The first four items were averaged to create a composite of uncertainty (α = .95),
and the latter three items were averaged to form a composite measure of negative affect
experienced during the manipulation (α = .82).
Results
Descriptives
Table 7, below, displays the means and standard deviations for all measures
across conditions.
Measure
Preference for anger article
Need for cognitive closure
Beliefs about the link between
anger and certainty
Manipulation Checks
Certain
Confident
Doubtful
Uncertain
Sad
Angry
Anxious

M
5.47
6.00
5.26

SD
2.63
1.45
2.17

5.54
5.69
4.29
4.57
4.03
2.30
4.74

2.77
4.31
2.79
2.94
2.63
2.55
2.84

Table 7. Means and standard deviations for main measures in Study 6.
Manipulation Check
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A two-way ANOVA revealed an effect of the uncertainty (writing) manipulation
on the composite measure of uncertainty, F(2,339) = 478.28, p < .001, ηp2 = .584.
Participants reported feeling more uncertain in the low certainty condition (M = 6.20, SD
= 1.88) than participants in the control condition (M = 2.16, SD = 1.43), p < .001. Neither
the main effect of the headline manipulation nor the interaction were significant, p’s >
.532.
The uncertainty (writing) manipulation also influenced negative affect, F(2,338) =
168.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .333. Upon reflecting back on the writing task, participants’
reported having experienced more negative affect in the uncertainty condition (M = 5.21,
SD = 1.94) compared to the certainty condition (M = 2.55, SD = 1.79). Neither the main
effect of the headline manipulation nor the interaction were significant, p’s > .344.
I also analyzed anger as a single item. There was a main effect of the uncertainty
(writing) manipulation, F(2,337) = 55.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .141, whereby participants in
the low certainty condition (M = 4.16, SD = 2.59) reported experiencing more anger than
participants in the high certainty condition (M = 2.23, SD = 2.06). Neither the main effect
of the headline manipulation nor the interaction were significant, p’s > .310.
Effects of the Certainty and Anticipated Headline Certainty Manipulations
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to test for effects of the manipulations on
preferences for reading the anger-inducing article. A significant main effect of headline
uncertainty emerged, F(2,339) = 5.40, p = .021, ηp2 = .016. Participants led to believe
they would feel uncertain after reading the anger inducing article (M = 5.12, SD = 2.58)
were less interested in reading the article compared to participants led to believe they
would feel certain after reading the article (M = 5.80, SD = 2.63). A marginal main effect
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of uncertainty (writing) condition also emerged, F(2,339) = 2.93, p = .089, ηp2 = .009.
Participants in the low certainty condition (M = 5.26, SD = 2.72) were less interested in
reading the anger article than participants in the high certainty condition (M = 5.73, SD =
2.49).
The interaction was not significant, F(2,339) = 1.15, p = .284, ηp2 = .003 (see
Figure 6), but simple effects suggested that participants were least interested in reading
the anger article after they wrote about uncertainty and they anticipated that the article
would make them feel uncertain (M = 4.76, SD = 2.71). This reflected a lower interest in
reading the anger article than the three other conditions, including uncertain participants
rating the certain headline (M = 5.72, SD = 2.65), certain participants rating the uncertain
headline (M = 5.55, SD = 2.36), and certain participants rating the certain headline (M =
5.91, SD = 2.62). Thus, as expected, participants who were uncertain preferred the anger
headline when it was expected to make them feel more certain compared to when it was
expected to make them feel less certain. However, contrary to expectations, among
participants who expected the headline to elicit certainty, uncertain and certain
participants did not differ in their preferences for reading the article, p = .647.
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Figure 6. Interaction of writing and headline conditions on preference for anger headline.
Moderation
No effects of the manipulation emerged on need for cognitive closure, p’s > .57,
or on awareness of the association between anger and certainty, p’s > .06. I thus tested
whether people who were uncertain wanted to read the anger headline when they
expected it to make them feel certain and when they wanted to reduce uncertainty. The
three-way interaction between writing condition, headline condition, and need for
cognitive closure was not significant, F(2,335) = 1.57, p = .212, ηp2 = .001. The threeway interaction between writing condition, headline condition, and awareness of the
association between anger and certainty was also not significant, F(2,335) = 0.37, p =
.546, ηp2 = .005.
Discussion
Study 6 tested whether people who are uncertain seek out anger only when they
believe it will make them feel certain. The results did not support my hypotheses.
Although people who were uncertain avoided the anger article more than any other group
when they thought it would make them feel more uncertain, they did not prefer the anger
article (compared to people who felt certain when) they thought it would make them feel
more certain.
There were several potential limitations to this study. First, the uncertainty
manipulation only lasted for 2 minutes, which is substantially shorter than manipulations
used in past research. It is possible that the manipulation was not strong enough. Second,
there was also no time delay between the manipulation and the headline rating task – the
latter task came immediately after the former. Past research on compensatory reactions to
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uncertainty suggests that a delay is needed for compensatory effects to emerge. Third,
although participants were told that a random selection of participants would read an
article, which was intended to encourage participants to take the rating task seriously,
participants were also told that the study would last only 5 minutes and half of this time
had gone by after they completed the manipulation. Thus, the cover story may not have
been sufficiently elaborate and participants therefore may not have anticipated that their
rating of their desire to read the anger-inducing article would influence their emotional
experience in a tangible way. For this reason, participants may not have made their
ratings with the intention of influencing the emotions or appraisals they would
experience. Relatedly, the cover story may have not provided participants sufficient
opportunity to get angry because it did not place emphasis on the facts presented in the
article headline (which could have provided a reason to feel anger toward ISIS). It is
important to note that all three of these methodological decisions – the short manipulation
task, the lack of a time delay, and the brief cover story – were all made this study shorter
and therefore inexpensive to run (the study ended up costing a total of just $150 to run
approximately 400 participants), thereby conserving resources that could be used in the
future to improve upon this paradigm. It is also important to note that these decisions
were not purely made on financial grounds. I reasoned that if effects could be detected
with a short writing task, without a time delay, and with a simple cover story, I could be
confident that they would emerge under even more hospitable methodological conditions.
Clearly, this turned out not to be the case, and I have learned that these effects do not
emerge even under these less hospitable conditions.
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While the paradigm pioneered in this study may need additional refining, it has
the potential to causally demonstrate that people who are uncertain prefer anger precisely
because it promises to provide them with a sense of certainty. Future research should
address these three methodological limitations and continue to pursue this strand of
evidence for the proposed model. Future research should also either manipulate need for
cognitive closure or measure it prior to the study in order to more appropriately test
whether people who are uncertain and motivated to reduce it would seek out anger only
when it has the potential to restore certainty. In sum, this paradigm promises to be
valuable and informative, but likely needs additional refining before it can provide strong
evidence for or against my proposed model.
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CHAPTER 8
STUDY 7: EXTENSION TO CONTROL AND GUILT
All of the data presented thus far for the proposed appraisal-based model of
emotional preferences has focused on one appraisal-emotion pair (i.e., certainty and
anger). Study 7 aimed to extend the model by considering a second appraisal-emotion
pair: control and guilt. Research demonstrates that guilt is an emotion that evokes a sense
of responsibility and control (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Given that people have a strong
desire for control (e.g., Kay, Whitson, Gausher, & Galinsky, 2009), an appraisal-based
perspective on emotional preferences would predict that people may want to feel guilty to
enhance appraisals of control, responsibility, and efficacy. Thus, people who lack a sense
of control over outcomes may be especially likely to want to feel guilty. In other words,
even though guilt is typically experienced as a negative emotion, people might be
motivated to seek it out to restore appraisals of control. To provide an initial test of this
idea, I used a paradigm similar to the one I used in Study 4. I manipulated the sense of
control using an autobiographical writing task and measured preferences for and
experiences of guilt by asking participants to write about personal life experiences in
which they felt guilty.
Participants
A total of 287 participants took part in the study via Amazon Mechanical Turk in
exchange for $0.75. I excluded 39 participants who did not follow instructions on the
uncertainty manipulation, the brief listing of several emotional life events, or the guilt
induction writing task (see below for details about these tasks) and four participants who
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reported not taking the study seriously, leaving 244 participants in the final sample (81
males, 161 females, 2 unreported).
Procedure
Participants were recruited to participate in a study on “autobiographical memory
and information processing” in which they would “write about several life experiences”
to help us better understand “how people process information about their lives.”
Participants were randomly assigned to write about an experience in which they had total
control over a situation, no control over a situation, or neither (in a neutral condition).
The manipulations were adapted from those used by Whitson and Galinsky
(2008). The instructions for the high/low control conditions were as follows:
In this first task, we are interested in how people process
particular autobiographical memories.
We would like you to write about a particular incident in
which something happened and you [had complete control /
did not have any control] over the situation. Please write
about the situation in which you felt [in complete control /
a complete lack of control] – what happened, how you felt,
etc.
Please describe this experience in as much detail as
possible. Please write for at least 3 minutes. The continue
button will appear below after 3 minutes have elapsed.
In the neutral condition, participants were asked to write about a typical
experience in their lives:
In this first task, we are interested in how people process
particular autobiographical memories.
We would like you to write about a typical experience in
your life. Please write about a typical and ordinary life
experience – what happened, how you felt, etc.
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Please describe this experience in as much detail as
possible. Please write for at least 3 minutes. The continue
button will appear below after 3 minutes have elapsed.
I chose not to include a distractor task in this study given that the literature on
compensatory control does not typically include time delays as in the literature on
uncertainty compensation.
Next, I assessed participants’ preferences for experiencing a variety of negative
emotions: guilt, sadness, and surprise. I selected these emotions because guilt is a
negative emotion high in sense of responsibility and control (and thus should be desirable
among individuals with a low sense of control), sadness is a negative emotion low in
sense of responsibility and control (and thus should not be desirable among individuals
with a low sense of control) and surprise is a positive emotion low in sense of
responsibility and control (and thus, despite its positivity, should also not be desirable
among individuals with a low sense of control). As in Study 4, participants generated
possible topics to write about for the longer writing task to follow; they were told:
In the upcoming writing task, you will be asked to write for
several minutes about a personal life experience in which
you felt a specific emotion.
First, however, we would like you to generate a possible
life experience that you might write about for each of the
emotions listed below.
Please think about experiences that made you feel each of
the following emotions. Then, in a brief sentence, please
describe an experience for each emotion type.
Participants listed experiences in which they felt guilt, sadness, and surprise.
Then, on the following page, their responses reappeared, and they were asked to rate the
extent to which they wanted to write (and think) about each of the three experiences to a
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greater extent using 9-point scales (Not at all interested – Very interested). Specifically,
they were told:
Next, you will see the experiences you generated on the
previous page. Please indicate the extent to which are you
interested in writing about each of the following
experiences for the upcoming full-length writing task:
Next, to ensure that all participants experienced guilt, we told participants, as a
cover story, that while their ratings will be taken into account, the emotion they write
about during the full length writing task will also be determined by an element of chance.
Then, all participants were asked to write about an experience in which they felt guilt,
and were told to write as much as they wanted:
On the next page, you will receive your writing prompt.
Please note that because we are looking to obtain a
sampling of experiences from each type of emotion, you
might not be asked to write about the emotion you
indicated the strongest preference for. Because we want a
somewhat even sampling of each emotion type, an
algorithm will generate an emotion for you to write about
based on the preferences you expressed as well as an
element of chance.
Click continue to receive your writing prompt and begin
the writing task.
Based on your responses, as well as an element of chance,
you were assigned to write about a life experience in which
you felt guilt.
In the space below, please write about a recent personal life
experience in which you felt guilt. You can write about the
same experience you briefly described earlier, or you can
write about a different experience.
Be sure to describe what you were/are guilty about, why
you felt/feel guilty about it, and how the emotion
manifested itself. Please describe this in as much detail
as possible.
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There is no timer for this task. Write as much as you feel is
necessary to fully describe the experience. Click the
continue button below when you are done writing.
Measures
After the guilt induction, the following measures were obtained.
Guilt writing task word count. As an indirect and unobtrusive index of engaging
in behaviors that prolong the experience of anger, I computed the length of each
participant’s written response (using a word count function).
Emotions. Immediately after the guilt induction, participants were asked to
indicate the extent to which they “currently feel” the following emotions a 9-point scale
(1 = Not at all, 9 = Very much): Guilt, Sadness, Surprise, Anger, Fear, Happiness,
Anxiety, Shame, Excitement, Regret, Embarrassment.
Desire to eliminate emotions. To assess the extent to which participants want to
continue feeling particular emotions, I asked participants to: “Imagine that there was a
pill that could eliminate the guilt you feel right now. To what extent would you want to
take such a pill?” Participants responded on a 9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = A great
deal).
Need for control. Rather than measure need for cognitive closure, as in the
previous studies, I used 14 items from the need for control scale (Burger & Cooper, 1979;
see appendix) to assess the desire for control (e.g., “I enjoy being able to influence the
actions of others,” “I enjoy having control over my own destiny,” “I prefer a job where I
have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it,” “I try to avoid situations where
someone else tells me what to do.” Participants responded using a 6-point scale (1 =
Strongly Disagree, 6 = Strongly Agree; α = .82).
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Beliefs about the link between guilt and responsibility. Participants responded
to the same question assessing their awareness of the association between guilt and a
sense of responsibility using the following item: “To what extent do you think that when
people feel guilt they feel a strong sense of responsibility?” Participants responded on a
9-point scale (1 = Not at all, 9 = Extremely).
Manipulation check. Participants indicated the extent to which they felt the
following emotions during the sense of control manipulation using a 9-point scale (Not at
all – Very much): In control, Sense of responsibility, Sad, Fearful, Angry, Anxious,
Guilty, Ashamed. Participants’ writing responses were displayed back to them at the top
of the screen to remind them which writing task these questions were referring to.
The first two items were averaged to form a composite measure of control (α =
.70). The latter six items were averaged to form a composite measure of negative affect
(α = .87). The last two items were averaged to form a composite measure of guilt (α =
.84).
Results
Descriptives
Table 8, below, displays the means and standard deviations for all measures
across conditions.
Measure
Preference for writing task
Guilt
Sadness
Surprise
Guilt writing task word count
Emotions after the guilt writing
task
Guilt
Regret
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M

SD

4.13
4.61
5.80
116.27

2.63
2.68
2.61
83.39

5.31
5.14

2.61
2.79

Sadness
Happiness
Shame
Anxiety
Embarrassment
Anger
Excitement
Fear
Surprise
Beliefs about the link between
responsibility and guilt
Need for control
Manipulation Checks
Control composite
In control
Sense of responsibility
Negative affect composite
Fearful
Sad
Angry
Anxious
Guilt composite
Guilty
Ashamed

4.73
4.49
4.27
4.12
3.80
3.00
2.92
2.74
2.43

2.70
2.49
2.75
2.72
2.61
2.37
2.32
2.31
1.88

7.21
4.34

1.66
0.70

4.34
5.96
6.46
3.36
3.24
3.96
5.08
3.30
2.57
4.39
2.67

0.70
2.73
2.41
2.07
2.64
2.78
2.80
2.76
2.19
2.87
2.44

Table 8. Means and standard deviations for main measures in Study 7.
Manipulation Check
The control manipulation had the anticipated effect on ratings on the composite
measure of control, F(2,239) = 55.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .317. Participants reported
experiencing less control in the low control condition (M = 4.53, SD = 2.18) than
participants in the neutral condition (M = 6.60, SD = 1.77), p < .001, who reported
experiencing less control than participants in the high control condition (M = 7.57, SD =
1.59), p = .001.
The control manipulation also influenced negative affect, F(2,239) = 23.13, p <
.001, ηp2 = .162. Participants reported having experienced more negative affect in the low
control condition (M = 4.51, SD = 2.02) compared to both the high control condition (M
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= 2.84, SD = 1.74), p < .001, and the neutral condition (M = 2.69, SD = 1.93), p < .001.
The high control and neutral conditions did not differ, p = .610.
I also analyzed effects on the guilt-shame composite separately. The control
manipulation condition did differ in the amount of guilt participants recall experiencing,
F(2,238) = 6.97, p = .001, ηp2 = .055. Participants reported having experienced more guilt
in the low control condition (M = 3.28, SD = 2.52) compared to both the high control
condition (M = 2.17, SD = 1.72), p = .001, and the neutral condition (M = 2.23, SD =
2.07), p = .001. The high control and neutral conditions did not differ, p = .846.
Main Effects of the Control Manipulation on Key Dependent Variables
Guilt writing task word count. No effect of the manipulation emerged on the
number of words participants wrote during the guilt writing task, F(2,241) = .47, p =
.627, ηp2 = .004.
Preferences for guilt, sadness, and surprise. Consistent with my primary
hypothesis, participants in the low control condition (M = 4.52, SD = 2.81) expressed a
stronger preference for writing about a guilt experience compared to participants in the
high control condition (M = 3.70, SD = 2.52), p = .047. Given that the neutral condition
fell in the middle of the other two conditions (M = 4.13, SD = 2.52) and did not differ
significantly from either one (p’s = .30 and .33), the omnibus test for differences among
all conditions was not significant, F(2,241) = 1.99, p = .138, ηp2 = .016. Yet given that the
conditions were not equated on guilt experienced during the writing manipulation, I
controlled for this variable, as well as the interaction between condition and guilt (as
recommended by Yzerbyt, Muller, and Judd, [2004] when the manipulation has an effect
on the covariate). In this analysis, the omnibus test of the effect of the manipulation on
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preferences for guilt was significant, F(2,235) = 4.14, p = .018, ηp2 = .034. Thus, these
analyses provide preliminary support for the notion that people who feel a lack control
prefer to feel guilty. No effects emerged on preferences for sadness or surprise, p’s > .48.
Emotions. No effects emerged on emotions reported after the guilt writing task,
p’s > .23.
Desire to eliminate emotions. No effect of the manipulation emerged on the
desire to eliminate guilt or sadness via a pill, p’s > .59.
Moderation by Individual Differences in Motivation and Knowledge
No effects of the manipulation emerged on need for control, F(2,239) = 0.06, p =
.939, or knowledge about the association between guilt and a sense of responsibility,
F(2,239) = 0.72, p = .490, allowing me to treat these variables as a moderators.
To test whether preferences for guilt emerge more strongly when people are
aware of guilt’s association with a sense of responsibility, I tested whether responses to
this item moderated the effect of the manipulation on the key dependent variables. Only
one significant interaction emerged. Knowledge about the relationship between guilt and
a sense of responsibility moderated the effect of the manipulation on the desire to
eliminate guilt with a pill, ΔR2 = .041, F(2,234) = 5.05, p = .007, ηp2 = .041 (see Figure
7). Among participants who were aware that guilt can be associated with a sense of
responsibility (1 SD above the mean), those in the low control condition expressed less
interest in eliminating their guilt with a pill relative to those in both the high control
condition, p = .006, and the neutral condition, p = .018. No significant effects of
conditions emerged among participants who did not believe that people who feel guilty
feel a sense of responsibility (1 SD below the mean). Further, in the low control
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condition, greater knowledge of the control-responsibility link was associated with less
interest in taking a pill to reduce guilt, b = -.52, SE = .20, p = .011, but this relationship
was absent in the high control condition, b = .14, SE = .20, p = .483, and nearly reversed
in the neutral condition, b = .30, SE = .17, p = .083. Thus, when people experience
normal levels of control, the more knowledge people have about guilt, the more they
want to reduce it. However, when people lack a sense of control and know that guilt can
confer it, they do not want to eliminate their guilt.
No interactions emerged with need for control, p’s > .19.

Control by Knowledge Interaction
Desire to Eliminate Guilt

5

4
Low control
High control

3

Neutral
2

1
Low Awareness of Control- High Awareness of ControlResponsibility Association Responsibility Association

Figure 7. The effects of control and beliefs about the association between anger and
certainty on the desire to eliminate guilt.
Covariates
Given that negative affect experienced during the control manipulation differed
by condition, I reran the analyses controlling for negative affect. The effects on
preferences for guilt and the desire to eliminate guilt remained unchanged.

89

Discussion
Study 7 sought to extend the evidence for the appraisal-based perspective on
emotional preferences to a second appraisal-emotion pair. Study 7 demonstrated that
people who lack a sense of control express a stronger preference for guilt. Further, those
who lack a sense of control but are aware of the link between guilt and a sense of
responsibility report that would they would be reluctant to eliminate their guilt if given
the opportunity. Study 7 therefore provides initial evidence that people seek out emotions
for their appraisals that goes beyond using anger as a test case. It suggests that people
may want to experience guilt – a negative emotion – in order to attain the appraisals it is
associated with. This somewhat counterintuitive finding may have broader implications
for research on guilt, an emotion that people sometimes try not to feel. The present
research suggests that it may be possible to give people an incidental reason to feel guilt
(e.g., an appraisal deficit). This work also provides a proof of concept that appraisalbased emotional preferences may extend broadly to other emotions. By providing
additional evidence for the theorized mechanism using an entirely different context, this
study enhances confidence in the mechanism hypothesized to underlie the findings from
all 7 studies, and begins to build a broader network of evidence supporting the broader
proposition that negative emotions may be sought out when particular appraisals are
desired.
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CHAPTER 9
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Are people motivated to experience emotions for their cognitive impacts? I found
that people who tend to be uncertain tend to experience greater levels of anger (Study 1),
that people experiencing momentary uncertainty, and who are motivated to reduce this
uncertainty, hold stronger preferences for anger, experience higher levels of anger (Study
2), and expect to engage in behaviors that would prolong their anger (Study 3) to a
greater extent than people who are not experiencing uncertainty or those who tend to be
tolerant of their uncertainty. I also found that people experiencing uncertainty choose to
write more about an anger-inducing event they experienced, report expending effort to
feel more angry about their experience, and actually end up feeling more angry about it
(Study 4). When people are motivated to tolerate and accept their uncertainty, they report
feeling less anger in response to an article about anger-inducing current events (Study 5).
Finally, when people experience a lack of control, they feel more guilty about a personal
life experience, suggesting they may be more receptive to feeling guilt when it can
address their appraisal needs (Study 7). Taken together, these findings provide
considerable evidence that 1) people tend to seek out and experience emotions that
address their appraisal needs, and that 2) that people become more receptive to feeling
negative emotions because of fundamental motivations to experience particular cognitive
appraisals.
The primary implication of this work is that emotions appear to be shaped not
only by cognitive appraisals themselves, but by a motivation to experience those
cognitive appraisals. Thus, this work illustrates a need to incorporate a motivational
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component into cognitive appraisal theories of emotion. By using cognitive appraisal
theories as a lens through which to understand emotional preferences, this work sheds
light on a new class of reasons for why people experience emotions. In a broader sense,
this work begins to more fully integrate the literatures on affect and cognition and
emotion regulation.
This research has employed numerous novel methods for inducing anger and
measuring emotional preferences. Evidence for my perspective emerged consistently
across numerous research designs (correlational, experimental), manipulations (certainty,
need for cognitive closure, sense of control), emotion inductions (video, article, writing
tasks), and samples (undergraduate students, more diverse online samples). The fact that
my hypotheses were supported across this diversity of methodologies begins to point
toward the scope and generalizability of the hypothesized processes.
The model of appraisal-based emotional preferences that I propose has the
potential to develop into a broad and comprehensive framework for understanding
emotional preferences that goes beyond the existing literature. My framework does not
contradict existing research on emotional preferences; rather it complements and extends
that work. Whereas Tamir’s (2009) research on utility focuses on people’s preferences
for emotions based on situations they anticipate being in after choosing how they want to
feel, my work focuses on people’s preferences for emotions based on appraisals they
experience before choosing how they want to feel. Moreover, the nature of the
mechanism underlying each phenomenon is fundamentally different: the processes I
outline can be best understood as efforts to compensate for appraisal deficits, whereas the
processes Tamir discusses can be best understood as efforts to match emotions to
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situational demands. Despite these differences, these perspectives are highly
complementary and could benefit from further integration.
Potential to Inform Interventions
This research has the potential to inform interventions that prevent the onset of
emotions by boosting the sought-after appraisal. The potential of this work to transform
emotion regulation interventions lies in the possibility that intervening on appraisals can
stem the experience of the earliest stages of the development of negative emotions. Just
as people engage in addictive behaviors such as drinking, smoking, and gambling in
pursuit of immediate gains while ignoring potentially harmful longer-term consequences,
it may be that people turn to negative emotions such as anger not always because the
situation demands it, but because of its (not always obvious) ability to cater to appraisal
needs. Individuals may be unaware that they are preferentially entering into angerinducing situations in order to temporarily fulfill a need to feel certain. By intervening on
the cognitive underpinnings of anger – a sense of uncertainty – it may be possible to stem
anger before it arises efficiently preventing a potential cycle whereby people implicitly
seek solutions to their appraisal needs in ways that ultimately lead to more problems.
This work also suggests a role for interventions that increase negative emotions
such as guilt. Thus, interventions could work in both directions. It should be noted that
anger is sometimes associated with positive outcomes in some contexts (e.g., Kitayama et
al., 2015) and thus it may be desirable in some cases to increase anger. Making people
aware of the motivational factors that alter their emotional responses to situational stimuli
could help them modulate their own emotional experiences more effectively and provide
them with the opportunity to exert more control over their emotions. If emotions are not
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straightforward responses to situations but rather depend on unrelated personal needs,
interventions that increase people’s awareness of these processes may allow them to
expend more effort on emotion regulation efforts and mitigate undesirable emotions.
Limitations and Future Directions
Despite the amount of evidence accumulated in this dissertation in support of this
phenomenon, additional research is needed to further rule out alternative explanations.
Specifically, additional research is necessary to continue to rule out the possibility that
the negative affect that inevitably coincides with uncertainty is driving the effects. In
Study 4, controlling for negative affect or anger experienced during the uncertainty
manipulation weakened or eliminated the effects. If uncertainty is inherently a negative
experience, this may not be surprising, as controlling for negative affect could effectively
covary out the effect itself. Future research should continue to take the approach
employed in Study 5 – equating the conditions on uncertainty and negative affect and
manipulating uncertainty intolerance. Future work might also include a negative affect
comparison condition in an effort to show that negative affect and uncertainty produce
different effects. But given that negative affect would also be predicted to elicit
uncertainty, one might expect such a condition to produce similar effects. Thus, an
approach similar to the one used by Tiedens and Linton (2001) – inducing negative affect
while manipulating the level of certainty evoked – may be useful. Experimental
approaches may prove to be more effective than statistical approaches in attempting to
disentangle uncertainty from negative affect. The present research argued most forcefully
against a negative affect or “vulnerability” interpretation of the effects by providing
positive evidence that the effects emerged for motivational reasons.
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There were several other limitations in this research. Continuing to attempt to
isolate anger from other negative emotions in the measurement of emotional preferences
and experiences will likely remain a challenge, but using participant-generated inductions
that direct participants to generate a specific emotion (as in Study 4) may be helpful in
achieving this. Future research should continue to refine the paradigm used in Study 6 in
order to more effectively test which component of anger people who are uncertain may
be seeking out. Effects did not emerge on the exact same DVs across studies and
individual differences in need for cognitive closure did not consistently moderate the
effects. Given the limitations identified in Study 3 associated with measuring need for
closure as a moderator at the end of a study, future research must either measure need for
closure prior to the study or manipulate it.
There are many other methodological tools that future research might utilize to
continue to address the questions I have focused on here. Additional implicit measures of
emotional preferences should be employed. For example, future work could use implicit
measures of attitudes toward anger, such as an implicit association test (IAT) assessing
associations between anger and positive versus negative concepts, or other social
cognitive measures of anger accessibility (e.g., lexical decision task). An IAT could also
be used to assess peoples’ implicit knowledge about the association between anger and
certainty. This implicit measure might prove to be a more consistent moderator than
explicit measures, as most of people’s awareness of the relationship between emotions
and appraisals is likely stored on an implicit level and developed through associations
people subconsciously make when experiencing the co-occurrence of particular emotions
with particular appraisals over time.
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Future research might employ psychophysiological measures of emotion as
implicit indices of how people want to feel. Such measures would go a long way in
circumventing the concerns about social desirability associated with reporting
preferences for negative emotions. The use of physiological measures of anger could also
help establish more concrete links between uncertainty-induced anger and important
downstream outcomes, such as physical health. Research demonstrates that anger is
associated with health issues such as hypertension, coronary heart disease,
atherosclerosis, and stroke (Anderson, McNeily, & Myers, 1991; Leventhal & PatrickMiller, 2000; Matthews, Salomon, Brady, & Allen, 2003; Matthews, 2005; Smith, 2006).
Connecting uncertainty management concerns to physiological reactions to anger could
help illustrate the downstream cardiovascular implications of appraisal-based emotional
preferences. Thus, this work could have implications for both mental and physical health
interventions.
Study 5 began to test the implications of these processes for intergroup relations.
Future work should continue to consider these implications. For example, future work
might test whether uncertainty makes people more likely to become activists fighting
against social causes that make them angry, thus showing potential positive downstream
consequences of anger for social activism and dissent.
In future work, I will consider the implications of this work for emotional aging
research. Research demonstrates that older adults experience anger to a markedly lower
degree than younger adults, a surprising phenomenon that has led anger to be labeled a
“special case” in emotional aging research (e.g., Blanchard-Fields, 2007). A future study
might test whether older adults’ greater prioritization of meaning in life (e.g., Carstensen
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et al., 1999) and possible subsequent feelings of certainty and self-assuredness explain
this age difference in preferences for and reactivity to anger. That is, it may be that as
people get older, they feel more certain and do not feel the need to pursue anger. Finally,
although the present research used healthy samples, subsequent studies should consider
the generalizability to individuals who have clinical levels of trait anger. Certainty
inductions or uncertainty tolerance might have especially dramatic effects in reducing
anger among such individuals.
Future research should begin to integrate research on the appraisal-based
emotional preference perspective with other factors known to influence emotional
preferences, such as utility and cultural context, which likely work in conjunction with
and moderate these effects. While the present research relied on need for closure as a
theoretically relevant moderator to illustrate the motivational nature of the effect, testing
these ideas cross-culturally could serve a similar function by showing, for example, show
people seek out emotions that
Conclusions
People appear to prefer emotions because of the appraisals they contain. As the
first foray into the study of emotional preferences based on appraisal dimensions, this
program of research promises to pioneer theoretical advances in the study of emotion, has
the potential to transform the way we think about the causes and interventions for the
experience of negative emotions, and may one day be used to understand a broad range of
phenomena in intergroup, interpersonal, and health-relevant contexts.
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APPENDIX:
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES MEASURES
Need for cognitive closure items
I don't like situations that are uncertain.
I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.
I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.
I feel uncomfortable when I don't understand the reason why an event occurred in my
life.
I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a group believes.
I don't like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it.
When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.
When I am confronted with a problem, I’m dying to reach a solution very quickly.
I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a solution to a problem
immediately.
I don't like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions.
I dislike it when a person's statement could mean many different things.
I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more.
I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life.
I dislike unpredictable situations.
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Need for control items
I prefer a job where I have a lot of control over what I do and when I do it.
I enjoy political participation because I want to have as much of a say in running
government as possible.
I try to avoid situations where someone else tells me what to do.
I would prefer to be a leader than a follower.
I enjoy being able to influence the actions of others.
I enjoy making my own decisions.
I enjoy having control over my own destiny.
I consider myself to be generally more capable of handling situations than others are.
I’d rather run my own business and make my own mistakes than listen to someone else’s
orders.
When I see a problem, I prefer to do something about it rather than sit by and let it
continue.
When it comes to orders, I would rather give them than receive them.
I wish I could push many of life’s daily decisions off on someone else.
I prefer to avoid situations where someone else has to tell me what it is I should be doing.
I would rather someone else take over the leadership role when I’m involved in a group
project.
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